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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the statistical verification and differential privacy in Cyber-
Physical Systems. The first part focuses on the statistical verification of stochastic
hybrid system, a class of formal models for Cyber-Physical Systems. Model re-
duction techniques are performed on both Discrete-Time and Continuous-Time
Stochastic Hybrid Systems to reduce them to Discrete-Time Markov Chains and
Continuous-Time Markov Chains, respectively; and statistical verification algo-
rithms are proposed to verify Linear Inequality LTL and Metric Interval Tempo-
ral Logic on these discrete probabilistic models. In addition, the advantage of
stratified sampling in verifying Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic on Labeled
Discrete-Time Markov Chains is studied; this method can potentially be extended
to other statistical verification algorithms to reduce computational costs.
The second part focuses on the Differential Privacy in multi-agent systems that
involve share information sharing to achieve overall control goals. A general for-
mulation of the systems and a notion of Differential Privacy are proposed, and
a trade-off between the Differential Privacy and the tracking performance of the
systems is demonstrated. In addition, it is proved that there is a trade-off between
Differential Privacy and the entropy of the unbiased estimator of the private data,
and an optimal algorithm to achieve the best trade-off is given.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) model physical processes that are controlled or
monitored by computer-based algorithms. They arise in various real-world appli-
cations ranging from automobiles [1], smart grids [2] and biology [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
These systems typically involve discrete, continuous, and stochastic behaviors, as
well as communication and information sharing.
In these contexts, it is often useful to determine if the systems meet their time-
dependent design goals. However, the verification problem is computationally
very challenging — even for systems with very simple dynamics that exhibit no
stochasticity, and for the most basic class of safety properties, namely invariants,
the problem of determining if a system meets its safety goals is undecidable [8].
The difficulty of the verification problem largely arises from the fact that the state
space of such systems has uncountably many states.
The computational challenge posed by the verification problem is often ad-
dressed by constructing and then analyzing a simpler finite state model. The finite
state model is typically an abstraction or a conservative over-approximation of the
original system, i.e., every behavior of the system is exhibited by the finite state
model, but the finite state model may have additional behaviors that are not sys-
tem behaviors. This approach has been used to verify [9, 10, 11] and design con-
trollers [12, 13, 14, 15] for non-stochastic systems, and to verify [4, 5, 7, 16, 17]
and design controllers [18] for stochastic hybrid systems. For such abstractions,
if the finite state model is safe, then so is the original system. However, if the
finite state model is unsafe, then not much can be concluded about the safety of
the original system because the finite state model is an over-approximation.
In the first part of this thesis, a scalable approach is proposed to verification
of stochastic hybrid systems that rely on constructing a finite state approximation
that is “equivalent” to the original system. The advantage of using a reduction that
is approximately equivalent to the original system is that analyzing the finite state
model not only allows us to conclude the safety of the hybrid stochastic system,
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but also its non-safety. The finite state Markov chain reduction is constructed by
using the Mori-Zwanzig model reduction method [19, 20].
In order to explain the relationship between the Markov chain and the stochastic
hybrid system, it is useful to recall that there are two broad approaches to defining
the semantics of a stochastic process. One approach is to view a stochastic system
as defining a measure space on the collection of executions, namely a sequence
of states that the system may possibly go through. The other approach is to view
the stochastic system as defining a transformation on distributions; in such a view,
the behavior of the stochastic model is captured by a sequence of distributions,
starting from some initial distribution. It has been observed that with respect to
the first semantics (of measures on executions) it is not possible to construct a
finite state Markov chain that is “equivalent” to an infinite state system [7]. Here,
in contrast, it is shown that the Mori-Zwanzig reduction method constructs a finite
state Markov chain that is approximately equivalent to a stochastic hybrid system
with respect to the second semantics. That is, the distribution on states of the
Markov chain at any time instance is close to the distribution at the same time
defined by the stochastic hybrid system.
This observation is similar in spirit to the results first established for non-
stochastic, stable, hybrid systems [12, 21, 22], and later extended to stochastic
dynamical systems [23, 24]. When compared to [23, 24], a more general class of
stochastic hybrid systems that have multiple modes and jumps with guards and
resets is considered here. Second, the reduced system is a Markov chain, whereas
in [23, 24] the stochastic system is approximated by a finite state, non-stochastic
model. Finally, the notion of distance between the stochastic hybrid system and
the reduced system is slightly different.
The fact that the reduced Markov model is approximately equivalent to the
original stochastic hybrid system is exploited to verify stochastic hybrid systems.
Approximate equivalence ensures that analyzing the reduced model with respect
to a suitably strengthened property determines whether the initial stochastic hy-
brid system meets or violates its requirements. Therefore, a scalable verification
approach can be obtained by developing algorithms to verify finite state Markov
chains.
Since the reduced system, even though having finite states, is likely to have a
large number of states, a statistical approach is adopted for verification [25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30] as opposed to a symbolic one. In statistical model checking, the model
being verified is simulated multiple times, and the drawn simulations are analyzed
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to see if they constitute a statistical evidence for the correctness of the model.
Statistical model checking algorithms have been developed for logics that reason
about measures of executions [6, 25, 31, 32]. However, since the reduced Markov
chain is only close to the stochastic hybrid system in a distributional sense, these
algorithms are not applicable.
Instead, new statistical model checking algorithms are developed for temporal
logics over discrete and continuous time that reason about sequences of distri-
butions. It is believed that this approach to verifying stochastic hybrid systems is
scalable, as an initial experimental evaluation supports this claim (see Example 1).
Also, this approach is the first to succeed in verifying [33] a highly non-linear
model including lookup tables of a powertrain control system that was proposed
as a challenging problem for verification tools by Toyota engineers [1].
The end of the first part is devoted to demonstrating that the computational costs
of statistical verification algorithms can be significantly reduced if the statistical
model checker draws correlated samples, as opposed to independent samples in
previous studies [34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41].
A common way to generate such negatively correlated samples with negligi-
ble additional computational cost is stratified sampling, which has been popular
among the statistics community in improving the accuracy of statistical estima-
tion [42, 43]. The general idea is to partition the sample space into different cells
and draw one sample from each one of them. The stratified samples are repellent
to each other — a sample occupying some cell forbids other samples entering the
cell. Therefore, the stratified samples will be negatively correlated.
The idea of using stratified samples in statistical model checkers is demon-
strated by a statistical verification algorithm for checking finite horizon Prob-
abilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) properties on Discrete-Time Markov
chains (DTMC) using stratified sampling. It is shown by theory and numerical
experiments that this algorithm, based on a sequential probability ratio test that
work with stratified samples, helps reduce the total number of samples (number
of strata × number of blocks of stratified samples) needed for a statistical model
checker to be confident in its answer.
Another challenging problem in the study of Cyber-Physical Systems is the
Differential Privacy of communication in distributed setups. Here, data about the
individual participating agents can help achieve better system-level performance;
however, at the same time, it is a requirement that the private data of these in-
dividuals be protected. Examples include peak generation scheduling using con-
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sumption data obtained from smart electric meters [44], traffic-aware navigation
based on location and destination data obtained from smart GPS [45, 46], and data
aggregation from sensor networks [47, 48].
In the second part of this thesis, the trade-off between ε-differential privacy and
performance is studied in the context of discrete-time linear distributed control
systems. In these systems, N agents operate in a shared environment which cou-
ples their dynamics. The agents coordinate with each other by communicating via
a central server, while tracking individual desired signals, referred to as prefer-
ences. The preferences together with the initial states are the private data of the
individual agents, and can be inferred from intercepted communications if agents
share their precise state.
To keep the sensitive data private, one common approach is to add noise to the
communicated information. The effectiveness of such an approach can be mea-
sured by using the concept of ε-differential privacy which stemmed from the study
of stochastic databases [49, 50, 51, 52] and was later extended to dynamical sys-
tems [53, 54]. It is a frequently used measure of privacy in various settings, such
as optimization [55, 56, 57] and consensus [53, 58]. Roughly, ε-differential pri-
vacy ensures that the probability distribution of any observation does not change
substantially with a change in the private data corresponding to any one agent.
During the past decade, several varieties of differential privacy have been pro-
posed [51, 53, 59, 60, 61]. The definition of differential privacy used in this cur-
rent work (Definition 22) is introduced in [61] which augmented the most com-
mon definition of differential privacy [51, 59] with metrics. The main technical
adjustment to the common definition is the introduction of a notion distance on
the continuous space of private data; a consequence of the generalization is that
greater changes in the private data of an agent now permit greater differences be-
tween the corresponding probability distributions of observation sequences.
While there are several notions of data privacy in the computer science litera-
ture, the quantitative and statistical nature of differential privacy makes it suitable
for adoption in control. The notion of differential privacy is first introduced in the
context of statistical databases where agents’ private information is their partici-
pation status in the database [49, 51]. In this context, two data sets are adjacent
if they are different in the (binary) data corresponding to a single agent and are
identical elsewhere. The definition of adjacency varies between contexts. For
example, for real-valued databases, like the definitions presented in [62, 63], ad-
jacent data sets are defined as identical data sets with one agent whose values
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are close (as measured by a metric on its real-valued variables). This notion of
differential privacy guarantees that two sets of behaviors, starting from two adja-
cent initial states and corresponding to any output sequence, are statistically close.
Various mechanisms for achieving differential privacy have been studied in the lit-
erature [64, 65, 66]. The Laplace mechanism requires adding a Laplace noise to
the query output and was proposed in [49].
In [54, 60, 67], the authors develop a notion of differential privacy which en-
sures that a filter cannot precisely estimate the input to a dynamical system by
looking at its output stream. Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms are presented
for converting an ordinary dynamical system to a differentially private one and
a Kalman filter is designed to estimate the states of a Gaussian mechanism with
minimized `2 error. The sufficient condition of the minimization problem is estab-
lished in the form of linear matrix inequalities. However, whether the Gaussian
mechanism is the best mechanism (in terms of metric like `2-norm or entropy) is
not addressed.
The problems introduced in these two papers differ in several ways from the one
studied in this thesis. First, in the class of systems studied in this thesis, an agent’s
dynamics may be coupled with the environment which depends on the aggregate
of all other agents’ states. Secondly, these systems are “closed loop” and the noise
added for privacy in one round affects all future states of the system. Further, in
Section 8 an optimization problem is formulated for a general class of “one-shot”
mechanisms and proved that the Laplace mechanism is optimal since it minimizes
system entropy. This optimality result is then generalized to feedback dynamical
systems.
When system noise is introduced, the quality of communication deteriorates,
and thus the performance of the system will be negatively influenced. In [68], the
authors study the optimal noise-adding mechanisms that minimize certain `1 cost
function while keeping the query ε-differential privacy and demonstrate that the
optimal solution is the staircase mechanism. In this thesis, the problem is studied
in the background of distributed control systems where time evolves and therefore
communication is repeated, in contrast to single-query problems. In addition, a
stronger metric definition of ε-differential privacy is adopted (see Section 2.6).
The performance measure is the aggregated mean-squared tracking deviation of
the agent trajectories from their preferences and the (Shannon) entropy of the
estimated private data.
One main contribution of this thesis is that an ε-differentially private mecha-
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nism communication strategy is designed for the discrete-time linear distributed
control systems and a trade-off is established between -differential privacy and
system performance. Specifically, the cost of privacy—namely the increase in the
mean-squared error of the agent trajectories from their preferences—is shown to
be O( T
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N2
) for stable systems, where T is the time-horizon length and N is the
number of agents. This cost can grow exponentially with T for unstable systems.
Beneficially from a privacy perspective, system noise hinders the accurate es-
timation of the agents’ states. The other main contribution of this thesis is that a
trade-off is established between ε-differentially privacy and the accuracy of opti-
mal estimation. Specifically, it is proved that the entropy of unbiased estimators
of the private data has a lower bound given in terms of N , the number of agents,
and n their individual-subsystem state dimension. A noise-adding mechanism that
achieves this minimum bound is presented.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The Preliminaries are given
in Chapter 2: specifically, Sections 2.1 to 2.3 are devoted to various temporal
logics in discrete or continuous time; Section 2.4 contains the essentials of statis-
tical verification; Section 2.5 introduces the Continuous-Time and Discrete-Time
Stochastic Hybrid Systems; and Section 2.6 is on the basics of differential privacy.
Part I of this thesis is devoted to the statistical verification of temporal logic
based on my previous papers [27, 28, 29, 33, 69, 70]. In Chapter 3, a model
reduction technique is demonstrated on the Discrete-Time and Continuous-Time
Stochastic Hybrid Systems to reduce them to Discrete-Time Markov Chains and
Continuous-Time Markov Chains, respectively. Following this, statistical verifi-
cation algorithms using independent samples are proposed for checking Linear
Inequality LTL on Discrete-Time Markov Chains and Metric Interval Temporal
Logic on Continuous-Time Markov Chains in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5,
the advantage of using stratified samples are illustrated by checking finite hori-
zon Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) properties on Discrete-Time
Markov Chains.
Part II of this thesis is devoted to the differential privacy in Multi-Agent Sys-
tems based on my previous papers [71, 72, 73, 74, 75]. In Chapter 6, the problem
formulation of differential privacy in these systems are given. In Chapter 7, the
trade-off between the level of differential private of the agents’ private data and
the tracking performance of the systems are studied. In Chapter 8, the impact of
differential privacy on estimating the agents’ private data is studied and an opti-
mal mechanism of adding correlated noise is proposed to minimize the entropy of
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the unbiased estimators of the private data. The conclusion of this thesis is given
in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Temporal Logics on Transition Systems
Temporal logics are sets of syntax and semantics rules to reason formally about
events over time. It is used extensively to describe the transitional behavior of
both discrete or continuous dynamical systems. In the discrete-time domain, Lin-
ear Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL) are used to spec-
ify properties on the paths and states of a system, respectively. Verifying these
two logics is decidable when the semantics are defined over Labeled Transition
Systems (LTS). In the continuous-time domain, Metric Temporal Logic (MTL)
extend Linear Temporal Logic. However, verifying Metric Temporal Logic is un-
decidable. Instead, only a fragment, Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL), also
known as Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [76, 77, 78], is decidable. Temporal logic
can also be extended to specify properties on probabilistic systems. For example,
Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic (PCTL), extending Computational Tree
Logic, can specify temporal properties on labeled Markov Chains (MC).
2.1.1 Labeled Transition Systems
Labeled Transition Systems, a.k.a. Kripke Structures is a nondeterministic discrete-
time and finite-state dynamical system with each state labeled by a set of atomic
propositions AP holding on that state.
Definition 1 (Labeled Transition Systems). A Labeled Transition System T is a
tuple, (S,AP,T, sinit, L), consisting of
• a finite set of states S,
• a finite set of atomic propositions AP,
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• a transition function T : S→ 2S,
• an initial state sinit,
• a labeling function L : S→ 2AP.
An infinite sequence of states s(∞) ⊆ S is called a path if
1. s0 = sinit,
2. si+1 ∈ T(si) for i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
An infinite sequence of atomic propositions a(∞) ⊆ AP is called an execution if
there exists a path s(∞) such that
ai ∈ L(si) for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
2.1.2 Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic is a set of formal rules for specifying path properties
over time. It is composed of three elements: a set of atomic propositions AP
whose correctness is known at each time instance, propositional logic operators
{¬,∧,∨, . . .}, and temporal operators {X,U, . . .}.
Definition 2 (LTL Syntax). A Linear Temporal Logic formula is defined by
ϕ ::= a|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ψ|Xϕ|ϕUTψ,
where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and T ∈ N is the time bound. When
T =∞, write U∞ as U.
In Definition 2, Xϕ stands for “next ϕ”, namely, the property ϕ holds at the
next time instance; ϕUTψ stands for “ϕ until ψ no later than time T ”, namely,
the property ψ holds at some time no later than T and before that ϕ holds. Also,
a minimal set of logic operators is used in Definition 2 — additional temporal
operators R,F,G are defined as follows:
• ϕRTψ = ¬(¬ϕUT¬ψ) stands for “ϕ release ψ no later than time T ”,
namely, ϕ remains true before some time no later than T and then ψ be-
comes and remains true.
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• Fϕ = TrueUϕ stands for “final ϕ”, namely ϕ finally becomes true.
• Gϕ = ¬(F¬ϕ) stands for “global ϕ”, namely ϕ is always true.
The standard semantics of Linear Temporal Logic is defined on Labeled Tran-
sition Systems having the same set of atomic propositions.
Definition 3 (LTL Semantics). Let T = (S,T, sinit, L) be a Labeled Transition
System, and s(∞) be a path of T . The satisfaction relation |= is defined recursively
by
s(∞) |= a iff a ∈ L(s0)
s(∞) |= ¬ϕ iff s(∞) 6|= ϕ
s(∞) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff s(∞) |= ϕ and s(∞) |= ψ
s(∞) |= Xϕ iff S(s(∞)) |= ϕ
s(∞) |= ϕUTψ) iff ∃t ≤ T,
(
∀τ < t, S(τ)(s(∞)) |= ϕ) ∧ S(t)(s(∞)) |= ψ
where S is the time shift operator and S(t) is the t-fold composition.
2.1.3 Bu¨chi Automata
A Bu¨chi automaton is a discrete-time finite-state dynamical system with transi-
tions between states labeled by alphabets. It takes a word, namely, a sequence
of alphabets, as input and returns accept when the corresponding sequence of
transitions lead to an accept state. The transitions can be either deterministic or
nondeterministic, and nondeterminism gives extra expressive power. In this thesis,
a Bu¨chi automaton means a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton.
Definition 4 (Bu¨chi Automata). A non-deterministic Bu¨chi automaton B is a tu-
ple, (S,A,T, sinit, Sfinal), consisting of
• a finite set of states S,
• a finite set of alphabet A,
• a transition function T : S× A→ 2A,
• an initial state sinit,
• a set of accept states Sfinal ⊆ S.
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The automaton B accepts a word a(n) ⊆ A, if there exists an accepting run
s(n+1) ⊆ S that satisfies
1. s0 = sinit,
2. si+1 ∈ T(si, ai) for i = 0, 1, . . . , n,
3. inf(s(n)) ∈ Sfinal.
A sequence of states satisfying (1) and (2) is called a run. The set of words ac-
cepted by the automaton B is called the language accepted by B and is denoted
by Lang(B).
For any LTL formula ϕ, a Bu¨chi automaton Bϕ can be constructed such that
Lang(Bϕ) = JϕK, i.e., the set of infinite words that satisfy ϕ is exactly those that
are accepted by Bϕ [79, 80, 81].
2.1.4 Computational Tree Logic
Computational Tree Logic is a set of formal rules for specifying state properties
over time. In addition to atomic propositions, propositional logic operators and
temporal operators, it contains two extra quantifiers A,E.
Definition 5 (CTL Syntax). A Computation Tree Logic state formula is defined by
Φ ::= a|¬Φ|Φ ∧Ψ|Aϕ|Eϕ,
where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and ϕ is a path formula; and a Computa-
tion Tree Logic path formula is defined by
ϕ ::= XΦ|ΦUTΨ,
where Φ,Ψ are state formulas and T ∈ N is the time bound. When T =∞, write
U∞ as U.
In most cases, Computation Tree Logic state formulas are of interest. Al-
though Computation Tree Logic contains more logic operators than Linear Tem-
poral Logic, the two logics are not comparable — there are properties that can
be expressed by one but not the other. This is because Computation Tree Logic
does not allow successively nested temporal operators — a temporal operator X
11
or U have to be combined with a quantifier A or E before nesting with another
temporal operator.
In Definition 5, the state formula Aϕ stands for “all ϕ”, namely, all the paths
starting from the state satisfy ϕ; and the state formula Eϕ stands for “exist ϕ”,
namely, there exist a path starting from the state satisfy ϕ Again, a minimal set of
logic operators are used in Definition 2 — additional temporal operators R,F,G
can be defined in the same way as in Section 2.1.2.
The standard semantics of Linear Temporal Logic is also defined on Labeled
Transition Systems having the same set of atomic propositions.
Definition 6 (CTL Semantics). Let T = (S,T, sinit, L) be a Labeled Transition
System, and s0 be a state of T . For the state formulas, the satisfaction relation |=
is defined by
s0 |= a iff a ∈ L(s0)
s0 |= ¬Φ iff s0 6|= Φ
s0 |= Φ ∧Ψ iff s0 |= Φ and s0 |= Ψ
s0 |= Eϕ iff for some path s(∞) |= ϕ
s0 |= Aϕ iff for every path s(∞) |= ϕ
where the path s(∞) starts from s0.
The satisfaction relation |= for the path formulas is defined in the same way as
Linear Temporal Logic in Definition 3.
2.2 Temporal Logic on Discrete-Time Markov Chains
Extending Discrete-Time Temporal Logics like Linear Temporal Logic and Com-
putation Tree Logic on Probablistic Systems like Discrete-Time Markov Chains
involves two steps:
1. Augmenting the syntax with the ability to reason about probability;
2. Transplanting the semantics of the logic operators to the Discrete-Time
Markov Chains.
For Linear Temporal Logic, re-defining and re-interpreting the atomic proposi-
tions as inequalities about linear functionals of the probability distributions on
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the states of the Discrete-Time Markov Chains leads to a probabilistic extension
called Linear Inequality LTL. For Computation Tree Logic, replacing the quanti-
fiers A,E with probabilistic quantifiers P leads to a probabilistic extension called
Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic. These two extensions have the ability to
reason on the temporal behavior of (labeled) Discrete-Time Markov Chains on the
distribution and state level, respectively.
2.2.1 Discrete-Time Markov Chain
Definition 7 ((Labeled) Discrete-Time Markov Chains). A Discrete-Time Markov
Chains is a tuple, (S,T, sinit), consisting of
• a finite set of states S,
• a transition probability function T : S× S→ [0, 1],
• an initial state sinit,
such that ∑
s∈S
T(s, s′) = 1.
A Labeled Discrete-Time Markov Chain is a tuple (S,AP,T, sinit, L) augmenting
the Discrete-Time Markov Chain by
• a finite set of atomic propositions AP,
• a labeling function L : S→ 2AP,
An infinite sequence of states s(∞) ⊆ S is called a path if
1. s0 = sinit,
2. T(si, si+1) > 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
An infinite sequence of atomic propositions a(∞) ⊆ AP is called an execution if
there exists a path s(∞) such that
ai ∈ L(si) for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Labeled Discrete-Time Markov Chains extends the common Discrete-Time Markov
Chains by labeling the set of atomic propositions AP holding on each state. They
can be viewed as an extension of Labeled Transition Systems by assigning a tran-
sition probability to each transition.
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2.2.2 Linear Inequality LTL
A Probabilistic System produces a sequence of distributions p(∞) over time. Lin-
ear Inequality LTL (iLTL) formulas reason about this sequence of distributions by
connecting atomic propositions that are inequalities about linear functionals on
the distributions with Linear Temporal Logic operators.
Definition 8 (iLTL Syntax). A Linear Inequality LTL formula is defined by
ϕ ::= ineq|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ψ|Xϕ|ϕUTψ,
ineq ::= w(p) > c.
where c ∈ R and w is a linear functional of distributions. By measure theory, for
a probabilistic distribution p on the states, it can be written as integration against
a weight function w : s→ R (with slightly abusing the notations)
w(p) =
∑
s∈S
w(s)p(s).
The semantics of Linear Inequality LTL can be defined abstractly over a se-
quence of distributions p(∞).
Definition 9 (iLTL Semantics). The semantics of Linear Inequality LTL is the
same as Linear Temporal Logic in Definition 3 except that the atomic propositions
are interpreted as
s(∞) |= ineq iff w(p0) > c+  for some  > 0
In Definition 8 and Definition 9, a minimal set of operators are used — addi-
tional operators can be defined, for example, w(p) ≤ c is equivalent to ¬(w(p) >
c). Since the semantics is defined in a robust manner, w(p) ≤ c and w(p) ≥ c are
equivalent to w(p) < c and w(p) > c.
2.2.3 Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic derives from Computation Tree Logic by
replacing the quantifiers A,E with probabilistic quantifiers P.
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Definition 10 (PCTL Syntax). Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A PCTL
formula is defined by
ϕ ::= a|¬ϕ|ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2|PJ(Xϕ)|PJ(ϕUTψ),
where a ∈ AP , J ∈ [0, 1] is an interval with rational bounds , T ∈ N is a time
bound. When T =∞, write U∞ as U.
With probabilistic modification, Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic has the
ability to reason over the paths that start from a state in Labeled Discrete-Time
Markov Chains.
Definition 11 (PCTL Semantics). Let (S,AP,T, sinit, L) be a Labeled Discrete-
Time Markov Chain. The semantics of PCTL is defined recursively by
s0 |= a iff a ∈ L(s)
s0 |= ¬ϕ iff s 6|= ϕ
s0 |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff s0 |= ϕ and s0 |= ψ
s0 |= PJ(Xϕ) iff P
[
s(∞) | S(s(∞)) |= ϕ] ∈ J
s0 |= PJ(ϕUTψ) iff P
[
s(∞) | ∃t ≤ T, (∀τ < t,S(τ)(s(∞)) |= ϕ) ∧ S(t)(s(∞)) |= ψ] ∈ J
where S is the time shift operator and S(t) is the t-fold composition.
It should be noted that Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic is not an extension
of Computation Tree Logic. They are not comparable — there are properties that
can be expressed by one but not the other. This is because, “for all” and “exists”
are not equivalent to “happens with probability 1” and “happens with positive
probability” in Probabilistic Systems.
2.3 Temporal Logic on Continuous Time Markov
Chains
In the continuous time domain, Discrete-Time Markov Chains and Linear Inequal-
ity LTL are extended to Continuous-Time Markov Chains and a variation of Met-
ric Interval Temporal Logic.
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2.3.1 Continuous-Time Markov Chain
Definition 12 (Continuous-Time Markov Chains). A Continuous-Time Markov
Chains is a tuple, (S,T, sinit), consisting of
• a finite set of states S,
• a transition rate function T : S× S→ R,
• an initial state sinit,
such that ∑
s∈S
T(s, s′) = 0.
2.3.2 Metric (Interval) Temporal Logic
Metric Temporal Logic extends Linear Temporal Logic to the continuous time
domain by extending and unifying the temporal operatorsUT , X toUI where I ∈
I≥0 is an interval on Q≥0. Let p(t) be the time-dependent distribution generated
by a Continuous-Time Markov Chain. Similar to Section Section 2.2.2, to define a
proper semantic of Metric Interval Temporal Logic, consider atomic propositions
of the form w(p) > c that are inequalities about linear functionals w of p(t). Then
the value of the linear functional f(t) = w(p(t)) is a real-valued function of time,
commonly referred to as a signal.
Definition 13 (MITL Syntax). An Metric Temporal Logic formula is defined by
ϕ = a|ϕ ∧ ϕ|ϕ ∨ ϕ|ϕUIϕ
where
a ::= f > c ∈ AP
and I ∈ I≥0. The logic is called Metric Interval Temporal Logic or Signal Tem-
poral Logic, if I 6= ∅.
The semantics of Metric (Interval) Temporal Logic is defined with respect to
the signals.
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Definition 14 (MITL Semantics). Let ϕ be an MITL formula and f be a signal
f : R≥0 → 2AP. The satisfaction relation |=between f and ϕ is defined by
s(∞) |= ineq iff f(0) > c+  for some  > 0
f(t) |= ¬ϕ iff f(t) 6|= ϕ
f(t) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (f(t) |= ϕ) ∧ (f(t) |= ψ)
f(t) |= ϕUIψ iff ∃t ∈ I, (f(t) |= ψ)
∧∀τ ∈ (0, t), f(τ) |= ϕ
Similar to Section 2.2.2, in Definition 13 and Definition 14, a minimal set of
operators are used — additional operators can be defined, for example, f ≤ c is
equivalent to ¬(f > c). Since the semantics is defined in a robust manner, f ≤ c
and f ≥ c are equivalent to f < c and f > c.
2.3.3 Timed Automata
Satisfiability and model checking problems for MITL with abstract atomic propo-
sitions are known to be EXPSPACE-complete [82]. The corresponding decision
procedure has a close connection with timed automata.
Definition 15 (Timed Automata [83]). A Timed Automaton T is a tuple (S,C,A,
L, I, E, sinit, Sfinal) where
• S is a finite set of states.
• C is a finite set of clocks.
• A is a finite alphabet.
• L ∈ S→ A maps each location to the label of that location.
• I ∈ S → (C → I≥0) maps each location to its invariant which is the set of
possible values of variables in that location.
• E ⊆ S× S× 2C is a finite set of edges of the form (s, d, j), where s = Se is
source of the edge; d = De is destination of the edge; and j = Je is the set
of clocks that are reset by the edge.
• sinit ⊆ S is the set of initial locations.
• Sfinal ⊆ S is the set of final locations.
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A run of the automaton T is a sequence of tuples (ρ, τ, η) ∈ S × I≥0 × E with
the following conditions holds: (i) ρ0 ∈ sinit, i.e., ρ starts from an initial location
sinit; (ii) (Sηn = ρn) ∧ (Dηn = ρn+1), i.e., the source and destination of edges
ηn are ρn and ρn+1; (iii) τ0, τ1, . . . is an ordered and disjoint partition of the time
horizon R≥0; and (iv) ∀t ∈ τn, x ∈ C, %n(x) + t − τn ∈ I(%n, x), where %n+1(x)
is defined inductively by
%n+1(x) =
0, if x ∈ Jηn%n(x) + τn − τn, otherwise
i.e., the clock times must satisfy the invariant of the current location. Here, τ and
τ are the lower and upper bound of the interval.
A run satisfying the condition inf(ρ)∩Sfinal 6= ∅, i.e., some location from Sfinal
has been visited infinitely many times by ρ, is called an accepting run of T . Note
that every run of T induces a function f of type R≥0 → A that maps t to L(ρn),
where n is uniquely determined by the condition t ∈ τn. The language of T ,
denoted by Lang(A), is the set of all functions that are induced by accepting runs
of T .
For any MITL formula ϕ, a Timed Automaton Tϕ can be constructed such that
Lang(Tϕ) = JϕK, i.e., the set of functions that satisfy ϕ is exactly those that are
induced by accepting runs of Tϕ.
2.4 Statistical Verification
Generally, there are two approaches to verify temporal logic formulas on proba-
bilistic systems: symbolic and stochastic. While the symbolic approach computes
the exact satisfying probabilities of the objective temporal properties, the stochas-
tic approach estimates these probabilities from samples with probabilistic guaran-
tees. Compared to the symbolic approach, statistical verification algorithms have
the following advantages: good scalability in high-dimension and complex system
and applicability to “black-box” systems with unknown or inaccurate models.
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2.4.1 Statistical Verification via Hypothesis Testing
The key step in statistical verification is to estimate the satisfying probability p
of Linear Temporal Logic formula ϕ, namely a Probabilistic Computation Tree
Logic formula P∼pϕ, from samples. More general temporal logic formulas can
be verified by composition [36, 37, 38].
Let X1, X2, . . . be independent the sample paths. The correctness of ϕ can be
determined for any trajectory X generated by the Markov chainM. Define with
a slight abuse of notation that
ϕ(X) =
1, if X satisfies ϕ,0, otherwise. (2.1)
Consequently, checking P<pϕ is equivalent to a composite hypothesis testing
problem
H0 : P [ϕ(X)] < p,
H1 : P [ϕ(X)] ≥ p.
(2.2)
Due to the robustness semantics Definitions 9 and 14, we assume that |P [ϕ(X)]−
p| > δ for some δ > 0.
Assumption 1. Let |P [ϕ(X)] − p| > δ for some known indifference parameter
δ > 0. The interval (P [ϕ(X)]− δ,P [ϕ(X)]+ δ) is called the indifference Region.
With Assumption 1, the composite hypothesis testing problem can be simpli-
fied to a simple hypothesis testing problem by testing the worst cases in the two
hypothesis H0 and H1,
H ′0 : P [ϕ(X)] ≤ p− δ,
H ′1 : P [ϕ(X)] ≥ p+ δ.
(2.3)
The hypothesis testing problem (2.3) can be solved efficiently with a sequential
probability ratio test (SPRT) as shown in [36, 37, 38]. Specifically, for a confi-
dence level of type I error
α = P [choose H ′1|P [ϕ(X)] = p− δ] > 0, (2.4)
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and type II error
β = P [choose H ′0|P [ϕ(X)] = p+ δ] > 0, (2.5)
consider the probability ratio
Λ(X(n)) = Πni=1
(p+ δ)ϕ(Xi)(1− p− δ)1−ϕ(Xi)
(p− δ)ϕ(Xi)(1− p+ δ)1−ϕ(Xi) , (2.6)
where X(n) = (X1, . . . , Xn). H0 is accepted if Λ(X(n)) > β1−α ; H0 is accepted if
Λ(X(n)) > 1−β
α
; otherwise, draw a new sample Xn+1.
2.4.2 Stratified Sampling
Most statistical verification algorithms depend on independent samples. However,
the verification cost can be significantly reduced if the statistical model checker
draws correlated samples Let us consider the core task of a statistical model
checker, namely, to determine if the measure of executions satisfying a property
ϕ is greater than some threshold p. For simplicity, assume that the truth of ϕ it-
self can be determined by a finite prefix of the execution. In such a situation, the
model checker draws sample executions, determines how many of the executions
satisfy ϕ, and uses this to estimate the measure of paths satisfying ϕ. Thus, each
sample can be viewed as a 0/1-valued random variable Xi (which takes value 1 if
the execution satisfies ϕ, and 0 otherwise), whose expectation is estimated by
X¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi.
One factor that plays an important role in determining how many samples are
needed for the algorithm to be confident in its answer is the variance. Informally,
the lower the variance of the estimate, the more likely the estimate is to be close to
the actual mean, and therefore, the algorithm requires fewer samples. In general,
the variance of the estimate is given by
Var
[
X¯
]
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
Var [Xi] +
2
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
Cov [Xi, Xj] .
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Figure 2.1: Independent samples v.s. stratified samples on unit square
If the samples are i.i.d., then the covariance is 0, and the variance is given by
Var
[
X¯
]
=
1
n
Var [X] .
However, as can be seen from the above expression, the variance can be reduced
if the samples are negatively correlated, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
Cov [Xi, Xj] ≤ 0.
A common way to generate such negatively correlated samples with negligi-
ble additional computational cost is stratified sampling, which has been popular
among the statistics community in improving the accuracy of statistical estima-
tion [42, 43]. The general idea is to partition the sample space into different cells
and draw one sample from each one of them. The stratified samples are repellent
to each other — a sample occupying some cell forbids other samples entering the
cell. Therefore, the stratified samples will be negatively correlated.
For example, 10 000 stratified samples can be drawn uniformly from the unit
square [0, 1]2 by first partitioning the area into 100 × 100 small cells, each of
size 0.01 × 0.01, and then draw exactly one sample from each cell. Figure 2.1
shows graphically that compared to 10 000 independent samples, 10 000 stratified
samples are negatively correlated, hence distribute more evenly on [0, 1]2.
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F (0, q, x)
Cq1
Cq2
at t = 0
F (T, q, x)
at t = T
Cq1
Cq2
Figure 2.2: A continuous-time stochastic hybrid system with two discrete states
at time 0 and T .
2.5 Stochastic Hybrid Systems
2.5.1 Continuous-Time
Continuous-time stochastic hybrid systems [84, 85, 86, 87] are a class of for-
mal models for Cyber-physical systems that incorporates discrete spontaneous
and forced jumps and continuous evolution and diffusion, as shown in Fig. 2.2.
As a continuous-time probabilistic model, it has a Fokker-Planck formulation and
interpretation.
The continuous and discrete states of the systems are denoted by x ∈ Rd and
q ∈ Q respectively, where Q = {q1, . . . , qm} is a finite set. The combination
(q, x) is called the state of the system, and the product set X = Q × Rd the state
space.
The state space X of the system is divided into two regions: a flow set A and
a jump set B = X\A. Define Aq =
{
x ∈ Rd | (q, x) ∈ A}, and Bq similarly.
It is assumed that each Aq is compact, and the boundaries ∂Aq are second-order
continuously differentiable in x. On the flow set, the state x of the system evolves
by a stochastic differential equation
dx = f(q,x)dt+ g(q,x)dBt, (2.7)
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where q and x are random processes describing the stochastic evolution of the
continuous and discrete states, and Bt is the standard n-dimensional Brownian
motion. The vector-valued function f specifies the drift of the state, and the
matrix-valued function g describes the intensity of the diffusion [88, 89]. In (2.7),
it is assumed that f(q, ·) and g(q, ·) are locally Lipschitz continuous. Mean-
while, the system jumps spontaneously by a non-negative integrable rate func-
tion rA(q, x). The probability distribution of the jumping target is given by a
non-negative integrable target distribution hA(q′, x′, q, x). When the state of the
system falls onto the jump set B, the system is forced to jump. The probability
distribution of the jumping target is given by a non-negative integrable target dis-
tribution hB(q′, x′, q, x). The two target distributions hA and hB defined on two
disjoint sets A and B are combined into one target transition h defined on the state
space X of the system and satisfying
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
h(q′, x′, q, x)dx′ = 1. (2.8)
The probability distribution F (t, q, x) of the state of the system is determined
by the standard Fokker-Planck equation
∂F (t, q, x)
∂t
= L(F (t, q, x))
= −
d∑
a=1
∂
∂xa
(fa(q, x)F (t, q, x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
drift
+
d∑
a=1
d∑
b=1
∂2
∂xa∂xb
d∑
c=1
gac(q, x)gcb(q, x)F (t, q, x)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
diffusion
−r(q, x)F (t, q, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump-out
+
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
h(q, x, q′, x′)r(q′, x′)F (t, q′, x′)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump-in
,
(2.9)
where L is the Fokker-Planck operator for the system. One can write symbolically
that F (t, q, x) = etLF (0, q, x). In (2.9), the four terms on the right hand side
describe “drift”, “diffusion”, “jump-out” and “jump-in”, respectively.
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On the other hand, a Fokker-Planck equation with proper boundary conditions
that give unique solution defines a stochastic differential equation with jump and
diffusion [88, 89]. Therefore, the following assumption is made.
Assumption 2. It is assumed that the stochastic hybrid system given in this section
is well defined in the sense that it gives a Fokker-Planck equation with a unique
solution.
A key component of the Mori-Zwanzig model reduction method is the invariant
distribution. It is assumed that the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system has
an invariant distribution with probability distribution function Finv(q, x) such that
L(Finv(q, x)) = 0. (2.10)
And, for any initial state, the probability distribution function F (t, q, x) converges
to the invariant distribution function Finv(q, x).
In many applications, the state of the system is only partially observable. Here,
the observables of interest are given by
y(t) = E[y(q(t), x(t))]
=
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)F (t, q, x)dx,
(2.11)
where γ(q, x) is a weight function on X, which is integrable in x for each q ∈ Q.
Example 1. Throughout this part, the following example is used to illustrate the
theorems. Consider a continuous-time stochastic hybrid system with two discrete
states on X = {1} × [0, 1] ∪ {2} × [2, 4]. It reflects at x = 0 and x = 4, jumps
uniformly to [2, 4] when hitting x = 1, and jumps uniformly to [1, 2] when hitting
x = 2. It can jump spontaneously at any x ∈ X with rate 1 with rA = IX/3.
In each location, the state of the system is governed by the stochastic differential
equation
dx = dt+ dBt, (2.12)
The probability distribution F (t, q, x) of the state evolves by the Fokker-Planck
equation
∂F (t, q, x)
∂t
=
∂F (t, q, x)
∂x
+
1
2
∂2F (t, q, x)
∂x2
(2.13)
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with the boundary conditions
∂
∂x
F (t, q, 0) = 0,
∂
∂x
F (t, q, 1) =
1
2
∫
[2,4]
∂
∂t
F (t, q, x)dx,
∂
∂x
F (t, q, 2) =
∫
[1,2]
∂
∂t
F (t, q, x)dx,
∂
∂x
F (t, q, 4) = 0.
(2.14)
Initially, the state of the system is uniformly distributed on [0, 1/2]. The goal is to
check the following Metric Interval Temporal Logic formulas Section 2.3.2 in the
system
ϕ1 = TU
(
y2(t) >
1
4
)
, (2.15)
ϕ2 =
(
y1(t) >
1
2
)
U
(
y2(t) >
1
4
)
, (2.16)
where
y1(t) =
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
I[0,1]F (t, q, x)dx, (2.17)
y2(t) =
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
I[2,4]F (t, q, x)dx. (2.18)
2.5.2 Discrete Time
Discretizing the time of the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system gives a
discrete-time stochastic hybrid system with the initial distribution F (0, q, x) and
transition function T (q′, x′, q, x), which is also a Markov kernel, satisfying
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
T (q′, x′, q, x)dx′ = 1, (2.19)
for any (q, x) ∈ X. The observable y is defined in the same way as in the
continuous-time case.
Definition 16. A Markov kernel T is called strictly contractive by factor α ∈
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(0, 1) if for any two distributions F (q, x), F ′(q, x),
‖TF (q, x)− TF ′(q, x)‖TV ≤ α‖F (q, x)− F ′(q, x)‖TV, (2.20)
For example, diffusive processes on compact state spaces are strictly contrac-
tive.
2.6 Differential Privacy
The concept of Differential Privacy (DP) is initially proposed to provide a measure
of the chances of identifying a record from queries of statistical databases. More
generally, it can be defined on a parametric probabilistic model, in which the
probability distribution fX(x; θ) of the observation X ∈ Rn depends on some
private data θ ∈ Rn.
The requirement of differential privacy gives an upper bound on how much the
probability distribution function fX(x; θ) can change with the private data θ. Let
‖ · ‖ be a norm on the private data θ, two versions, non-metric and metric, of -
Differential Privacy can be defined, in which the Metric version is stronger than
the Non-Metric version.
Definition 17 (Differential Privacy). The parametric probabilistic model is -
Differentially Private, if for any θ, θ′, x ∈ Rn and set of possible observations
O ⊆ Rn, the probability distribution function satisfies
(Non-Metric)
∫
O
fX(x; θ)dx ≤ e
∫
O
fX(x; θ
′)dx, for ‖θ − θ′‖ ≤ 1,
(Metric)
∫
O
fX(x; θ)dx ≤ e‖θ−θ′‖
∫
O
fX(x; θ
′)dx.
Given a deterministic query, a common way to make it -Differentially Private
is to add Laplace noise. A Laplace noise v with parameter λ, written as v ∼
Lap(λ), has a probability distribution function
fLaplace(x) =
1
2λ
exp(−|x|
λ
). (2.21)
The definition extends to n-dimensional random vectors by using the `1-norm,
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namely, w ∼ Lap(λ, n) if
fLaplace(x) =
(
1
2λ
)n
exp(−‖x‖1
λ
). (2.22)
Note that the components of the Laplace random vector are independent.
Finally, for the parametric probabilistic model, the (Shannon) entropy of the
randomized observation is given by
H(X) = −
∫
Rn
fX(x) ln(fX(x))dx. (2.23)
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Part I
Statistical Verification
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL REDUCTION OF STOCHASTIC
HYBRID SYSTEMS
In this chapter, the model reduction technique is demonstrated on the Discrete-
Time and Continuous-Time Stochastic Hybrid Systems to reduce them to Discrete-
Time Markov Chains and Continuous-Time Markov Chains, respectively.
3.1 Discrete Time
3.1.1 Reducing the Dynamics
A Discrete-Time Stochastic Hybrid Systems can be reduced to a Discrete-Time
Markov Chain using the set-oriented methods [90]. Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}
be a partition of the continuous state space X, and P,R be the corresponding
projection and injection operators as given by (3.16)-(3.18). As shown in Fig. 3.1
and Theorem 1, they induce a projection from the Markov kernel T : m(X) →
m(X) to a Markov kernel Tr : m(S)→ m(S) by
Tr = PTR. (3.1)
For multiple steps, the diagram for projection is shown by the non-commutative
diagram in Fig. 3.2.
F (t, q, x) F (t+ 1, q, x)
p(t) p(t+ 1)
R
T
Tr
P
Figure 3.1: Diagram for single-step reduction
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F (0, q, x) F (1, q, x) F (t− 1, q, x) F (t, q, x)
p(0) p(1) p(t− 1) p(t)
R
T
Tr
T
Tr
P
Figure 3.2: Diagram for multiple-step reduction
Theorem 1. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be a measurable partition of the state space X.
Then the discrete-time stochastic hybrid system reduces to a CTMC (Tr, p0) by
p0(i) =
∫
si
F (0, q, x)dx,
Tr(i, j) =
∫
si
∫
sj
T (q′, x′, q, x)dx′dx.
(3.2)
3.1.2 Reduced iLTL
An observable on the discrete stochastic hybrid system can be reduced approxi-
mately to an observable on the discrete-time Markov chain by (3.21). At a time t,
discrepancy between y(t) and y′(t) is given by (1).
Lemma 1. For any F (q, x) ∈ m(X) and projection operator P , the following
statements hold:
y(0) > b+ δP (F )‖F‖∞ =⇒y′(0) > b,
y′(0) > b+ δP (F )‖F‖∞ =⇒y(0) > b,
y(0) < b− δP (F )‖F‖∞ =⇒y′(0) < b,
y′(0) < b− δP (F )‖F‖∞ =⇒y(0) < b,
where
δP (F ) = ‖F (0, q, x)− PF (0, q, x)‖TV, (3.3)
is the error of projection operator P in total variance.
Therefore, the iLTL formulas associated with the discrete-time stochastic hy-
brid system are reduced to iLTL formulas associated with the Markov Chains
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(Tr, p0) by replacing the integration with the summation. The reduced iLTL is
exactly the form proposed in [91].
3.1.3 Reduction Error Estimation
First, the projection operator P is contractive.
Lemma 2. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be a measurable partition of X and P be the
projection operator associated with S. For any F (q, x), F ′(q, x) ∈ m(X),
‖PF (q, x)− PF ′(q, x)‖TV ≤ ‖F (q, x)− F ′(q, x)‖TV. (3.4)
As shown in the non-commutative diagram in Fig. 3.2, the discrepancy for t
steps is
∆t = ‖PT (t)F (0, q, x)− T (t)r PF (0, q, x)‖TV
= ‖PT (t)F (0, q, x)− P (TRP )(t)F (0, q, x)‖TV.
(3.5)
The error bound of t-step projection is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Given a discrete-time stochastic hybrid system and a projection op-
erator P , the t-step (t ≥ 1) error of projection
∆t ≤
t−1∑
i=0
δP ((TRP )
(i)F (0, q, x)), (3.6)
where δP is given in (3.3).
Proof. For t = 1,
∆1 = ‖PTF (0, q, x)− P (TRP )F (0, q, x)‖TV
≤ ‖TF (0, q, x)− TRPF (0, q, x)‖TV
≤ ‖F (0, q, x)−RPF (0, q, x)‖TV
= δP (F (0, q, x)).
(3.7)
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For t > 1, with F denoting F (0, q, x),
∆t =‖PT (t)F − P (TRP )(t)F‖TV
≤‖T (t)F − (TRP )(t)F‖TV
≤‖T (t)F − T (t−1)(TRP )F‖TV
+ ‖T (t−1)(TRP )F − T (t−2)(TRP )(2)F‖TV
+ . . .+ ‖T (TRP )(t−1)F − (TRP )(t)F‖TV
≤
t−1∑
i=0
δP ((TRP )
(i)F ).
(3.8)
When T is strictly contractive, there exists a uniform error bound.
Theorem 3. Given a discrete-time stochastic hybrid system, a projection operator
P and the corresponding injectionR, if the Markov kernel T is strictly contractive
by factor α ∈ (0, 1), then the t-step (t ≥ 1) error of projection
∆t ≤ δP
1− α, (3.9)
where
δP = sup
i∈N
δP ((TRP )
(i)F (0, q, x)). (3.10)
Proof. For t = 1, clearly ∆t = δP . For t ≥ 2, by (3.8) and with F denoting
F (0, q, x),
∆t ≤‖T (t)F − T (t−1)(TRP )F‖TV
+ ‖T (t−1)(TRP )F − T (t−2)(TRP )(2)F‖TV
+ . . .+ ‖T (TRP )(t−1)F − (TRP )(t)F‖TV
≤(1 + α + . . .+ αt)δP
≤ δP
1− α.
(3.11)
By combining Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, the following theorem can be derived
on the relationship between linear inequalities on the original Markov process and
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linear inequalities on the reduced Markov process.
Theorem 4. Given a measurable partition S = {s1, . . . , sn} and the correspond-
ing projection operator P , a discrete-time stochastic hybrid system and its reduc-
tion (Tr, p0) satisfies the equations:
y > b+
δP‖F‖∞
1− α =⇒ y
′ > b, (3.12)
y′ > b+
δP‖F‖∞
1− α =⇒ y > b, (3.13)
y < b− δP‖F‖∞
1− α =⇒ y
′ < b, (3.14)
y′ < b− δP‖F‖∞
1− α =⇒ y < b, (3.15)
where δp is given by (3.10) respectively.
3.2 Continuous Time
3.2.1 Reducing the Dynamics
To implement the Mori-Zwanzig model reduction method [19] for continuous-
time stochastic systems, the continuous state space is divided into finitely many
partitions S = {s1, . . . , sn}, and treat each of them as a discrete state. It is as-
sumed that for each si, there exists q ∈ Q such that si ⊆ {q} ×Aq, and denote its
measure by µ(si). Let m(X) and m(S) be set of probability distribution functions
on X and S, respectively. Define a projection P : m(X)→ m(S) and an injection
R : m(S)→ m(X) between m(X) and m(S) by
pj = (PF (q, x))j =
∫
sj
F (q, x)dx, (3.16)
where pj is the jth element of p, and
Rp =
n∑
j=1
pjIsj , (3.17)
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where Isj is the uniform distribution on sj:
Isj(x) =
 1µ(sj) , if x ∈ sj0, otherwise. (3.18)
Here the projection P and the injection R are defined for probability distribu-
tions. But they extend naturally to L1 functions on X and S respectively. The pro-
jection P is the left inverse of the injection R but not vice versa, namely PR = I
but RP 6= I .
This projection P and injection R can reduce the Fokker-Planck operator to
a transition rate matrix on S, and hence reduce the continuous-time stochastic
hybrid system into a continuous-time Markov chain.
Theorem 5. Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} be a partition of the continuous state space
X and P ,R be the corresponding projection and injection defined in (3.16)-(3.18).
The Fokker-Planck operator given in (2.9) reduces to the transition rate matrix A
of a continuous-time Markov chain on S by
A = PLR (3.19)
where the transition rate from state si to sj at time t is given by
Aij =
∫
∂si∩∂sj
f(q, x)dx
+
1
µ(si)
∫
si
r(q, x)Ih(q,x)∈sjdx
(3.20)
for a, b = 1, . . . , n, where Ih(q,x)∈sj = 1 when h(q, x) ∈ sj , and 0 otherwise.
Roughly speaking, the transition rate between two partitions in the same loca-
tion is the flux of f(q, x) across the boundary and the transition rate between two
different locations is the flux of r(q, x).
3.2.2 Reducing MITL Formulas
The observables on the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system reduce to the
corresponding continuous-time Markov chain using the projection P . Let y be an
observable on the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system with weight function
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γ(q, x). To facilitate further discussion, it is assumed that γ(q, x) is invariant under
the projection P , i.e., γ(q, x) = Pγ(q, x). Define a corresponding observable
y′ on the continuous-time Markov chain that derives from the model reduction
procedure by
y′(0) =
∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)PF (0, q, x)dx
=
n∑
i=1
(∫
si
γ(q, x)dx
)(∫
si
F (0, q, x)dx
)
=
n∑
i=1
rip(i) = y
′(0).
(3.21)
In the rest of this section, denote the corresponding observable on the CTMC
by y′ for any observable y on the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system.
For a given observable y with weight function γ(q, x), the error of the projection
P with respect to the observable y is defined by the maximal possible difference
between y and y′,
∆y =
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)(F (0, q, x)−RPF (0, q, x))dx
∣∣∣. (3.22)
Remark 1. When refining the partition of X, RP → I in the weak operator
topology, thus ∆y → 0 for any given y.
By the definition of ∆y, at the initial time, the atomic propositions on the
continuous-time stochastic hybrid system and the CTMC have the relations
y(0) > c =⇒ y′(0) > c−∆y, (3.23)
y(0) < c =⇒ y′(0) < c+ ∆y, (3.24)
and similarly,
y′(0) > c+ ∆y =⇒ y(0) > c, (3.25)
y′(0) < c−∆y =⇒ y(0) < c. (3.26)
To derive the relations of the observables between the continuous-time stochas-
tic hybrid system and the CTMC at any time, define the reduction error of the
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F (0, q, x) F (t, q, x)
p(0) p(t)
P
eLt
eAt
R
Figure 3.3: Diagram for reduction error.
observable y at time t due to the model reduction process by
Θy(t) = |y(t)− y′(t)|
=
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)(eLt −ReAtP )F (0, q, x)dx
∣∣∣, (3.27)
where F (0, q, x) is an initial distribution of the continuous-time stochastic hybrid
system and y′(t) is the corresponding observable of y(t) on the CTMC. This re-
duction error is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. Note that the diagram is not commutative;
actually the difference between going along the two paths is related to the reduc-
tion error.
In general, the reduction error Θ(t) may not be bounded as t → ∞. To find
a sufficient condition for boundedness, define the reduction error of the Fokker-
Planck operator L by
δ(t, q, x) = (L−RPL)etRPLF (0, q, x). (3.28)
Accordingly, define the integration of δ(t, q, x) with respect to the weight function
γ(q, x) by
Λy = sup
t≥0
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)(L−RPL)etRPLF (0, q, x)dx
∣∣∣, (3.29)
which captures the maximal change of the time derivative of observable y.
A sufficient condition to find a uniform bound over time is that the reduction
error of the Fokker-Planck operator δ(f(q, x)) converges exponentially in time for
any f(q, x) ∈ m(X).
Definition 18. For α > 0, β ≥ 1 and a given observable y, the continuous-
time stochastic hybrid system is α-contractive with respect to y, if for any initial
36
distribution function F (0, q, x) on the state space,∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)etLδ(t, q, x)dx
∣∣∣
≤ βe−αt
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)δ(t, q, x)dx
∣∣∣. (3.30)
where δ(t, q, x) is given by (3.28).
This contractivity condition, though it seems restrictive, is valid for a relatively
wide range of systems including asymptotically stable systems. It is a commonly-
used sufficient condition to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an invariant
measure for general dynamical systems, and the contractivity factor α is usually
derived case-by-case.
Theorem 6. If the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system is α-contractive, then
for any t ≥ 0, the reduction error Θy(t) for an observable y satisfies
Θy(t) ≤ βΛy
α
+ ∆y. (3.31)
Proof. By Dyson’s formula, the exponential of L is decomposed by
etL = etRPL +
∫
[0,t]
e(t−τ)L(L−RPL)eτRPLdτ. (3.32)
This formula, sometimes referred to as Duhamel’s principle, can be verified by
taking time derivatives on both sides. Substituting (3.32) into (3.27) gives
Θy(t) ≤
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
γ(q, x)(etRPL −RetAP )F (0, q, x)dx
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd×[0,t]
γ(q, x)e(t−τ)L(L−RPL)eτRPLF (0, q, x)dτdx
∣∣∣ (3.33)
Since the projection P and the injection R preserve the L1 norm, RPL is also a
Fokker-Planck operator. Noting RetAPF (0, q, x) = etRPLPF (0, q, x), by (3.22),
the first term on the right hand side of (3.33) is less than ∆y.
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By (3.29)-(3.30), the second term on the right hand side of (3.33) satisfies
Θy(t) ≤ ∆y +
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
∫
[0,t]
γ(q, x)e(t−τ)Lδ(τ, q, x)dτdx
∣∣∣
≤ ∆y +
∣∣∣∑
q∈Q
∫
Rd
∫
[0,t]
βe−α(t−τ)γ(q, x)δ(τ, q, x)dτdx
∣∣∣
≤ βΛy
α
+ ∆y.
(3.34)
Theorem 6 implies the following relations between the atomic propositions on
the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system and the CTMC.
Theorem 7. If the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system is α-contractive, then
y(t) > c =⇒ y′(t) > c−
(βΛy
α
+ ∆y
)
, (3.35)
y(t) < c =⇒ y′(t) < c+
(βΛy
α
+ ∆y
)
, (3.36)
and similarly,
y′(t) > c+
(βΛy
α
+ ∆y
)
=⇒ y(t) > c, (3.37)
y′(t) < c−
(βΛy
α
+ ∆y
)
=⇒ y(t) < c. (3.38)
The above theorem gives the following result.
Theorem 8. Given a MITL formula ϕ on the continuous-time stochastic hybrid
system that is α-contractive, it can be strengthened to ψ by replacing the atomic
propositions according to (3.37)-(3.38). If ψ is true on the corresponding CTMC,
then ϕ is true on the continuous-time stochastic hybrid system.
Example 2. First, the invariant distribution of this process is Finv = IX/3. Fol-
lowing Example 1, X is partitioned into intervals of length 1/N . By the above
model reduction procedure it reduces to a CTMC with transition matrix M given
by
Mij =
δij
4
+
1
4N
(3.39)
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where i, j ∈ [3N ]. The invariant distribution Finv remains unchanged, and the
MITL formula to check is
ϕ′1 = TU
(
y′2(t) >
1
4
+ δ(N)
)
(3.40)
ϕ′2 =
(
y′1(t) >
1
2
+ δ(N)
)
U
(
y′2(t) >
1
4
+ δ(N)
)
(3.41)
where δ(N) is the model reduction error and
y′1(t) =
N∑
i=1
pi(t), (3.42)
y′2(t) =
3N∑
i=2N+1
pi(t). (3.43)
When N = 30, it can be computed that δ(N) ≤ 0.02 from (3.16) and (3.29).
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CHAPTER 4
STATISTICAL VERIFICATION OF ILTL
AND MITL ON MARKOV CHAINS
In this chapter, statistical verification algorithms are proposed for checking Linear
Inequality LTL on Discrete-Time Markov Chains and Metric Interval Temporal
Logic on Continuous-Time Markov Chains.
4.1 Linear Inequality LTL
Denote the atomic proposition y =
∑n
i=1 ripi = r · p by a pair (r, b). For an iLTL
formula ϕ and a discrete-time Markov chain generating a sequence of distributions
w = p0p1p2 . . ., define u = u0u1u2 . . . where ut = {(r, b) ∈ APϕ | r · pt > b} is
the set of atomic propositions that are true at time t. Then w |= ϕ, iff u |= ϕ. As
mentioned in Section 2.1.3, ϕ can be transformed into a Bu¨chi automatonBϕ such
that JϕK = Lang(Bϕ), meaning Bϕ accepts exactly those sequences that satisfy
ϕ. This suggests the following algorithm to check if a Markov chain satisfies an
iLTL formula ϕ. Let w be the (unique) sequence of distributions generated by that
Markov chain.
1. Construct the sequence u ∈ (2AP)ω of atomic propositions that are true at
each step of w.
2. Check u ∈ Lang(Bϕ) and return the result as the algorithm output. It will be
the right answer since (Tr, p0) |= ϕ iff w |= ϕ iff u |= ϕ iff u ∈ Lang(Bϕ).
The details on the two steps are given below.
Constructing the labels for distributions To construct the set of labels ut cor-
responding to the distribution wt = pt, the simplest algorithm would compute
pt = T
(t)
r p0 first and then for every atomic proposition (r, b) ∈ APϕ, check
whether or not r · pt > b is true. However, this would be expensive for Markov
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chains with a large number of states. Instead, these labels are computed statisti-
cally. First, draw samples according to distribution pt by simulating the Markov
chain for t steps. Assuming the elements of each vector r in atomic propositions
are from {0, 1}. In this case, pt satisfies (r, b) iff the probability of drawing a state
s (according to pt) such that rs = 1 is strictly greater than b. This can be sta-
tistically checked by drawing samples from pt and using either Chernoff bounds,
or the Sequential Probability Ratio Test [92] (see [32] and [31]). Such a statisti-
cal test usually takes as parameters an indifference parameter δ2 > 0, and error
bounds α2, γ2 > 0. The output of this test is yes, no, or unknown with conditions:
P[res = no | r · pt > b ] ≤ α2, (4.1a)
P[res = yes | r · pt 6> b ] ≤ α2, (4.1b)
P[res = unknown | |r · pt − b| > δ2] ≤ γ2. (4.1c)
The parameters δ2, α2, γ2 can be made arbitrarily small, though that will in-
crease the number of samples needed. The general case when elements of r can
be arbitrary real numbers requires one to estimate the mean of a random variable
that is not necessarily Bernoulli. In such a situation, the Sequential Probabil-
ity Ratio Test cannot be used, but a technique due to Chow and Robbins can be
used [93].
Running Bϕ on the labels The sequence of labels u = u0u1 . . . can be con-
structed statistically, symbol by symbol. However, u is an infinite sequence, and
in order to run Bϕ on u, u needs to ultimately periodic, i.e., there must be finite
sequences u1 and u2 such that u = u1uω2 . It is assumed that the mapping defined
by the reduced model is contracting and hence the sequence w converges to the
invariant distribution pinv that is known for some bounded uncertainty. This as-
sumption is readily verified for large classes of important physical models, such as
those with energy balance laws that are dissipative in aggregate. For such models,
general arguments can be used to derive the prior condition, even in the presence
of strong nonlinearities, discontinuous dynamics, or other complexities. Define
η = max(r,b)∈AP‖r‖1 to be the size of largest vector in atomic propositions and
without loss of generality, assume it is positive. It is assumed δ′ > 0 and p∗
(an estimate of pinv) are given such that ∀(r, b) ∈ AP, |r · pinv − b| > δ′ and
‖pinv − p∗‖1 < δ′3η are both true. Since w converges to pinv, for any atomic propo-
sition (r, b), |r · pinv − b| > δ′, for large enough t. pt and pinv will satisfy exactly
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the same propositions and so u is ultimately periodic. Also, note that if pinv is
known precisely then it can be checked if such δ′ exists; otherwise, the supremum
of all such δ′ can be found.
1. UsingA, with parameters 1
2
min{α, γ} and δ′
3η
find m such that pm is within
distance δ
′
3η
of p∗ and hence within distance 2δ
′
3η
of pinv (see function NumberOfSamplingSteps
in Algorithm 1). Let (r, b) ∈ APϕ be an arbitrary atomic proposition, and
let p be any distribution for which ‖p− pinv‖ ≤ 2δ′
3η
. Clearly this includes p∗
which is known exactly, and any distribution pm′ for m′ ≥ m.
|r · p− r · pinv| ≤ ‖r‖1 × 2δ
′
3η
≤ 2δ
′
3
(4.2)
From (4.2), if r · pinv − b > δ′ then r · p − b > δ′ − 2
3
δ′ > 0, and if
r · pinv − b < −δ′ then r · p − b < −δ′ + 2
3
δ′ < 0. Therefore, assuming a
proper m, truth values of atomic propositions do not change in pmpm+1 . . ..
2. For each t < m and atomic proposition (b, r) ∈ AP, use A with parameters
δ2 = δ, α2 = α2m|AP| , and γ2 =
γ
2m|AP| , to determine if r ·pt > b (see function
LabelFiniteNumberOfSteps in Algorithm 1).
3. For every atomic proposition (b, r) ∈ AP, verify if r · p∗ > b is true or
not (see function AddLabelsOfInvariantDistribution in Algorithm 1).
Note that there will be no error at this step, since p∗ is known precisely.
Also, after this step, asg is defined for all t ∈ N and q ∈ AP. Whenever
asg(t, q) = unknown, consider both possibilities. With this consideration,
function asg induces a set of infinite sequences on alphabet 2AP. Since after
m, asg is a constant function, this set can be easily represented by a Bu¨chi
automaton JasgK.
4. Verify if Lang(Bϕ) and its complement has any intersection with Lang(JasgK).
If both intersections are non-empty, it means different choices for unknown
slots (i.e., yes or no) can lead to both satisfying ϕ and not satisfying it.
Therefore, the algorithm returns unknown. Otherwise, if Lang(Bϕ) has
no intersection with Lang(JasgK), the resulting infinite sequence can never
satisfy ϕ, hence the algorithm give no. The only remaining case is when
Lang(B¬ϕ) has no intersection with Lang(JasgK) , and using a similar ar-
gument, the right answer will be yes. Note that, Lang(B¬ϕ) is exactly
complement of the set Lang(Bϕ), a fact which is used multiple times.
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The algorithm A outlined above provides the following guarantees:
P[A((Tr, p0), ϕ, α, γ) = no|(Tr, p0) |= ϕ] ≤ α (4.3a)
P[A((Tr, p0), ϕ, α, γ) = yes|(Tr, p0) 6|= ϕ] ≤ α (4.3b)
P [A((Tr, p0), ϕ, α, γ) = unknown|
6 ∃(b, r) ∈ AP, |r · pt − b| ≤ δ] ≤ γ (4.3c)
The first two inequalities state that probability of having false positive or negative
is at most α. The last inequality states that if in all steps that have distributions
far enough from the invariant distribution, the actual probability of no atomic
proposition (r, b) in ϕ is too close to b then the probability of returning unknown
is at most γ.
The error analysis of the algorithm can be carried out as follows. When the
algorithm returns no (yes) while the correct answer is yes (no), it means that the
algorithm made at least one mistake. The probability of finding wrong m is at
most α
2
. Assuming m is computed correctly, the probability of having a step t
and an atomic formula q ∈ AP such that truth value of q at step t is computed
incorrectly is at most (m|AP|) α
2m|AP | =
α
2
(here unknown is considered a correct
answer, because it did not effect the output of the algorithm). Therefore, the total
error is at most α = α
2
+ α
2
.
Similarly, if the algorithm returns unknown while for any step that is far enough
from the invariant distribution, the actual probability of no atomic proposition is
too close to the threshold of that proposition, it means either the algorithm found
m incorrectly, or it found unknown for at least one step and one atomic proposition
incorrectly. But the probability of making each of these mistakes is at most γ
2
.
Thus the probability of incorrectly returning unknown is at most γ.
A takes δ as one of its parameters. The problem with δ is that one may not
know in advance the correct value for δ. Large values cause the algorithm to
return unknown, and small values make the algorithm slow. In order to solve this
problem one can start with a a large value for δ and decrease it when the algorithm
returns unknown for that δ.
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4.2 Metric Interval Temporal Logic
Given a CTMC C and a MITL formula ϕ with atomic propositions APϕ, a timed
automaton TC,APϕ can be constructed by sampling, whose reachable locations at
time t are labeled by the atomic propositions in ϕ that are true on C. By JC,APϕK
denote the singleton set containing the unique signal induced by C and ϕ. For
simplicity, consider constructing TC,{P} for a single atomic formula P : y =∑n
i=1 ripi > c, denoted by a pair (r, c). Let f(t) be the set of atomic formulas that
p satisfies at time t, i.e., (p, c) ∈ f(t) iff p(t) > c. Also, let TC,{P}(t) be the set of
reachable locations of TC,{P} at time t.
Lemma 3. [94] For any α, δ > 0, and two discrete distributions p and p′, there
is a test A(p, p′, α, δ) which runs in time O(n2/3(2δ)−8/3 log(n/α)) such that if
‖p − p′‖ ≤ max
(
δ4/3
214/3 3
√
n
, δ
4
√
n
)
then the test accepts with probability at least
1− α, and if ‖p− p′‖ > δ then the test rejects with probability at least 1− α.
It is assumed an estimation p∗ of the invariant distribution pinv are given such
that ∀(p, c) ∈ AP, |pinv − c| > δ′ and |pinv − p∗| < δ′
3
for some δ′ > 0. Since
p(t) converges to pinv due to contractivity, |p(t) − c| > δ′, for large enough t.
Using Lemma 3, the truncation time T can be found such that for t > T , |p(t) −
p∗| < δ′
3
, namely |p(t) − pinv| < 2δ′
3
. Therefore, if pinv − c > δ then p∗ − c > 0.
Similarly, if pinv − c < −δ then p∗ − c < 0. Note that exactly one of pinv − c > δ
and pinv− c < −δ is true. Furthermore, p∗− c > 0 and p∗− c < 0 cannot be both
true. Therefore, p∗−c > 0 implies pinv−c > δ, p∗−c < 0 implies pinv−c < −δ,
and p∗ − c is never zero.
For any δ1 > 0, let ∆ = δ13 max{|p˙i(t)||t∈[0,T ]} . Then, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
t′ ∈ [t−∆, t+ ∆] ∩ [0, T ],
1. if pi(t)− c > δ13 , then pi(t′)− c > 0,
2. if pi(t)− c < − δ13 , then pi(t′)− c < 0,
3. if |pi(t)− c| ≤ 2δ13 , then |pi(t′)− c| ≤ δ1.
The time interval [0, T ) is partitioned into at least
⌊
T
2∆
⌋
+1 intervals, each of size
smaller than 2∆. Let [t1, t2] be one of these intervals and runA, for t = 12(t1 + t2)
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to derive
res1 = Aδ1/3
(
pi(t), c+
δ1
3
, α′, γ′
)
,
res2 = Aδ1/3
(
pi(t), c− δ1
3
, α′, γ′
)
,
where A statistically check If res1 = yes then ∀t′ ∈ [t1, t2), (pi(t′) > c) holds
with bounded error α′. Therefore, set TC,{P}(t) = {P}. If res2 = no then for
any time t′ ∈ [t1, t2], pi(t′) < c holds with bounded error α′. Therefore, set
TC,{P}(t) = {∅}. Otherwise, for any time t′ in the interval, |pi(t′)− c| ≤ δ1 with
bounded error max(α′, γ′). In this case, set
• TC,{P}(t) = {q, q′},
• L(q) = {P} and L(q′) = ∅,
• entry to q or q′,
• switches between q and q′ for arbitrary number of times, while their com-
mon invariant permits.
The result of the above procedure res = Aδ1,δ2(C, y0, ϕ, α, β) satisfies
P[res = no | C |= ϕ] ≤ α (4.4)
P[res = yes | C 6|= ϕ] ≤ α (4.5)
As for the unknown output, let Bδ1(y) be the δ1-ball centered at y in the L∞
norm. The algorithm guarantees that
P[res = unknown] ≤ α + β (4.6)
for all y′ ∈ Bδ1(y).
Definition 19. For any  > 0 let y + B be the set of observables achieved by
slightly perturbing y. Let C be any object with observables in the set y+B. The
satisfaction relation of CTMC C and MITL formula ϕ is called -robust, if
1. For all y′ induced by C, y′ |= ϕ, or
2. For all y′ induced by C, y′ 6|= ϕ.
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The satisfaction relation is called robust, if it is -robust for some  > 0.
By definition 19, for any CTMC C and MITL formula ϕ, if C is robust on ϕ,
iteratively reducing δ1 in the algorithm guarantees that it will eventually return an
answer which is not unknown while satisfying conditions (4.4) and (4.5).
Example 3. Following Example 2, running Algorithm 2 on the CTMC shows that
both ϕ′1 and ϕ
′
2 are true. This implies that the formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 given are true
on the Continuous-Time Stochastic Hybrid System in Example 1.
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Algorithm 1 Model checking Markov chains against iLTL formulas
Data: Markov chain (T, p0), estimation of invariant distribution p∗, iLTL formula
ϕ, parameters α, γ, δ, and δ′
Result: yes, no, or unknown
Function NumberOfSamplingSteps()
t← 0 η ← max
(r,b)∈AP
‖r‖1 while A
(
pt, p
∗, 1
2
min{α, γ}, δ′
3η
)
= failed do
t← t+ 1
end
return t
Function LabelFiniteNumberOfSteps(m ∈ N)
forall t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, (r, b) ∈ AP do
asg(t, (r, b))← Aδ2(pt, r, b, α2m|AP| , γ2m|AP|)
end
return asg
Function AddLabelsOfInvariantDistribution(m ∈ N, asg ∈ N × AP →
{yes, no, unknown})
forall t ∈ {m,m+ 1, . . .}, (r, b) ∈ AP do
if r · p∗ > b then
asg(t, (r, b))← yes
else
asg(t, (r, b))← no
end
end
return asg
Function ModelCheck
m ← NumberOfSamplingSteps() asg ←
LabelFiniteNumberOfSteps(m) asg ←
AddLabelsOfInvariantDistribution(m, asg) JasgK ← the Bu¨chi
automaton that accepts exactly the set of infinite paths induced by asg if
Lang(Bϕ) ∩ Lang(JasgK) 6= ∅ ∧ Lang(B¬ϕ) ∩ Lang(JasgK) 6= ∅ then
return unknown
else if Lang(Bϕ) ∩ asg = ∅ then
return no
return yes
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Algorithm 2 Truncating time horizon
Data: CTMC (T, y0), estimation of invariant distribution y∗, MITL formula ϕ,
parameters α, γ, δ, and δ′
Function DurationOfSimulation
t← 0
η ← max
(p,c)∈AP
‖p‖1
while A
(
yt, y
∗, 1
2
min{α, γ}, δ′
3η
)
= failed do
t← t+ 1
end
return t
Algorithm 3 Constructing the signal for atomic proposition P
h ← max{|y˙i(t)| | t ∈ [0, T ]}, ∆ ← δ13h , n ← |AP|
⌈
T
∆
⌉
, TC,{P} ← an empty
automaton, C← {t}, qlast ← ⊥
forall i← 0 to ⌊ T
∆
⌋
do
α′ ← min( α
4n
, β
2n
), β′ ← β
n
res1 ← Algorithmδ1/31
(
pi
(
(i+ 1
2
)∆
)
, c+ δ1
3
, α′, β′
)
res2 ← Algorithmδ1/31
(
pi
(
(i+ 1
2
)∆
)
, c− δ1
3
, α′, β′
)
add a new location q to S
if res1 = yes then
L(q)← {P}
else if res2 = no then
L(q)← ∅
else
L(q)← unknown
I(q)← 2i∆ ≤ t < 2(i+ 1)∆
if qlast 6= ⊥ then
E← E ∪ {(qlast, q, ∅)}
else
sinit ← {q}
qlast = q
end
add a new location q to S
I(q)← true, Sfinal ← {q}
E← E ∪ {(qlast, q, ∅), (q, q, ∅)}
if yinv > c then
L(q)← {P}
else
L(q)← ∅
TC,{P} ← replace any unknown location in S with q and q′ labeled {P} and ∅.
Duplicate edges from/to q and q′ accordingly
Add (q, q′, ∅) and (q′, q, ∅) to E for every split locations in the previous step.
return TC,{P}
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CHAPTER 5
STATISTICAL VERIFICATION OF PCTL
USING STRATIFIED SAMPLES
Stratified sampling method is a popular method to generate negatively correlated
samples that have lower variance. In this chapter, a statistical model checking
algorithm is proposed for checking finite horizon Probabilistic Computation Tree
Logic (PCTL) properties on Discrete-Time Markov Chains using stratified sam-
pling. This algorithm significantly reduces the computational cost, compared to
other algorithms using independent samples.
To ensure a lucid exposition of the main ideas, consider Probabilistic Com-
putation Tree Logic formulas of the form P∼pϕ, where ϕ is a formula without
probabilistic operator; in other words, ϕ’s truth can be determined on a single
path. PCTL formulas in general form with nested probabilistic operators can be
handled in the standard manner using the approach proposed in [36, 37, 38]. The
main result is a sequential probability ratio test that works when samples are drawn
using stratified sampling, which helps reduce the total number of samples (number
of strata × number of blocks of stratified samples) needed for a statistical model
checker to be confident in its answer.
5.1 Markov Chains
Consider a discrete-time (homogeneous) Markov chainM of n numbered states
with initial state s ∈ [n] and transition probability matrixM , in whichMij defines
the transition probability from i to j. For any j ∈ [n],
n∑
i=1
Mij = 1. (5.1)
For a sample path X = {X(t)}t∈N ⊆ [n] of the Markov chain,
X(t+ 1) = f(X(t), E(t)), t ∈ N (5.2)
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where E(t) ∼ U[0,1). Generally, a Discrete-Time Markov ChainM can be rep-
resented in (5.2) in multiple ways. In this work, the following representation is
chosen
f(i, e) =
1, if 0 ≤ e < Mi1j, if ∑j−1k=1Mij ≤ e <∑jk=1Mij. (5.3)
5.2 Stratified Sampling
As shown in (5.2), the Markov chain is driven by the random seed E(t) uniformly
sampled from the interval U[0,1]. Therefore, there is a bijection between the space
of sample paths of the Markov chain M of length T and [0, 1]T . The stratified
sampling algorithm generates m sample paths simultaneously. At each time t, the
interval [0, 1) can be partitioned into m sub-intervals, namely [0, 1] = [0, 1
m
] ∪
. . . ∪ [m−1
m
, 1). Thus, a sample can be drawn from each sub-interval. To avoid
correlation between steps, a permutation pi is generated on [n] uniformly at each
time t, and then assign the sub-interval [pi(i)−1
m
, pi(i)
m
) to the ith path. The random
seeds of the m-stratified sample paths are repellent to each other in [0, 1]T , hence,
due to the choice of f(i, e) in (5.3), the m-stratified sample paths are repellent to
each other in the space of sample paths. This is summarized by Definition 20 and
Algorithm 4. Compared to i.i.d. samples, the additional computational cost for
generating stratified samples is negligible.
Definition 20. {Xi}i∈[m] is called m-stratified samples if they are generated by
Algorithm 4.
5.3 Hypothesis Testing Using Stratified Samples
In this section, a statistical verification algorithm using stratified sampling is pro-
posed to demonstrate the significant advantage of negatively correlated samples
over independent samples in statistically verifying temporal logic specifications.
As mentioned in Section 1, consider Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic formu-
las of the formP∼pϕ, where ϕ is a Linear Temporal Logic specification. When the
sample pathsX1, X2, . . . are drawn independently, the statistical verification prob-
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Algorithm 4 m-stratified sampling
Require: Number of strata m, number of steps T , and initial state s
1: t = 0
2: for i ∈ [m] do
3: Xi(0) = s
4: end for
5: for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
6: Take pi as a permutation of [m]
7: for i ∈ [m] do
8: Take Ei ∼ U[pi(i)−1
m
,
pi(i)
m
)
9: Xi(t+ 1) = f(Xi(t), Ei(t))
10: end for
11: end for
12: return {Xi}i∈[m]
lem (2.3) can be solved efficiently with a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT),
as mentioned in Section 5.3.
5.3.1 Properties of Stratified Samples
To implement the SPRT on m-stratified samples {Xi}i∈[m], consider the statistics
Y =
m∑
i=1
ϕ(Xi)/m. (5.4)
The generation of the stratified samples in Algorithm 4 shows that
E [Y ] = E
[
m∑
i=1
ϕ(Xi)/m
]
= E [ϕ(Xi)] . (5.5)
In addition, for certain PCTL formulas ϕ, ϕ(X1,i), . . . , ϕ(Xm,i) can be generated
negatively correlated, such that
Var [Y ] ≤ Var
[
m∑
i=1
ϕ(Xi)/m
]
= Var [ϕ(Xi)] /m. (5.6)
By the syntax of PCTL, ϕ is either of the form Xψ or ψ1U≤Tψ2, where ψ1 and
ψ2 are directly checkable on the states of the Markov chainM. Denote the set of
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states where ψ holds by
Vψ = {s ∈ [n]|ψ ∈ L(s)} . (5.7)
Assumption 3. For a PCTL formula of the form ϕ = ψ1U≤Tψ2, it is assumed that
(i) Vψ2 ⊆ Vψ1;
(ii) The states of the Markov chainM are numbered such that Vψ1 = [n1] and
Vψ2 = [n2] where n1 ≥ n2.
Theorem 1. With Assumption 3, let {Xi}i∈[m] bem-stratified samples from Markov
chainM and ϕ be a probabilistic-operator-free PCTL formula with satisfaction
probability p, then for any and i ∈ [m],
(i) E [
∑m
i=1 ϕ(Xi)/m] = P [ϕ(Xi)];
(ii) Cov [ϕ(Xi), ϕ(Xj)] ≤ 0 for i 6= j.
Now, the hypothesis testing problem (2.3) can be converted to
H ′0 : E [Y ] = p− δ,
H ′1 : E [Y ] = p+ δ.
(5.8)
In addition, the mean of m-stratified samples within each block are more concen-
trated than the mean of m independent samples with the same mean,
Var [Yi] =
1
m2
Var
[
m∑
j=1
ϕ(Xj,i)
]
=
1
m
Var [ϕ(Xj,i)] +
1
m
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
Cov [ϕ(Xj,i), ϕ(Xk,i)]
≤ 1
m
Var [ϕ(Xj,i)] .
(5.9)
Theorem 1 shows that compared to the mean m independent samples, the mean
a group of m-stratified samples have the same mean, but smaller or at least equal
variance. In addition, it shows that refining stratification always reduces the vari-
ance. Specifically, given anm-stratification, by refining each stratum into n strata,
an mn-stratification can be derived. The new mn-stratified sampling algorithm
will be no worse than the old m-stratified sampling algorithm.
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Finally, there is no loss of statistical information by considering Yi given by (5.4)
instead of (X1,i, . . . , Xm,i).
Theorem 2. Let pi(x1, . . . , xm) be the joint probability mass function of ϕ(X1),
. . . , ϕ(Xm), then the value of p only depends on
∑m
i=1 ϕ(Xi).
5.3.2 Sequential Probability Ratio Test
By Theorem 2, it suffices to consider Yi to solve (2.3). Now given Y (n) =
(Y1, . . . , Yn) ⊆ {0, 1/m, . . . , 1}, an SPRT algorithm similar to (2.6) can be con-
structed,
Λ′(Y (n)) = Πni=1
piH1(Y
(n))
piH0(Y
(n))
. (5.10)
where piH1 and piH0 are the probability mass function of Yi under hypothesis H0
and H1 respectively.
However, unlike the i.i.d. case in (2.6), the exact form of piH1 and piH0 is hard
to derive. Therefore, for simplicity, an asymptotic approach is taken via Central
Limit Theorem. Let ν(Y (n)) be the empirical distribution given Y (n), then the
Wald statistics converges to normal distribution N(0, 1) for large n
Zn =
Y¯i − θ
σi
→ N(0, 1) (5.11)
where θ = E [Y ] and
Y¯i =
1
i
i∑
k=1
Yk, σ
2
i =
1
i
i∑
k=1
(Yk − Y¯i)2 (5.12)
are the sample mean and sample variance respectively. Therefore, the probability
ratio in (5.10) converges to
Λ′(Y (n))→ Ce−
2(Y¯i−p)δ
σ2
i , n→∞, (5.13)
for some normalizing constant C. In practice, this approximation is sufficiently
accurate when the number of samples n ≥ 30 and E [Y ] is not close to the end-
points 0 and 1, since the converge of probability ratio (5.13) is faster. When E [Y ]
is close to 0 or 1, the distribution pi(y) of Y will become skew, and the convergence
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is slower [95, 96]. When the number of strata m = 1, the probability ratio (5.13)
is equal (2.6) in large sample limit n→∞. Using (5.13), a sequential hypothesis
testing algorithm can be constructed (Algorithm 5).
Algorithm 5 SPRT using stratified samples
Require: Number of strata m, Probability threshold p, Indifference Parameter δ,
Confidence level α, β > 0, Minimal number of samples N
1: r ← 0
2: ν ← {0, . . . , 0} ∈ Zm+1
3: while true do
4: r ← r + 1
5: Take m-stratified samples {X1,r, . . . , Xm,r}
6: Yr ←
∑m
i=1 ϕ(Xi,r)
7: ν(Yr)← ν(Yr) + 1
8: if r ≥ N/m then
9: µr ←
∑m+1
i=1
i−1
m
ν(i)∑m+1
i=1 ν(i)
10: σ2r ←
(∑m+1
i=1 (
i−1
m )
2
ν(i)∑m+1
i=1 ν(i)
− µ2r
)
/r
11: if µr − p < −σ2r2δ ln(1−αβ ) then
12: Return H0
13: else if µr − p > σ2r2δ ln(1−βα ) then
14: Return H1
15: end if
16: end if
17: end while
5.4 Simulation
The sequential probability ratio test algorithm using stratified samples (Algo-
rithm 5) is implemented on a small scale toy example and several more com-
plicated benchmarks from [97]. In all the simulations, set the type I (2.4) error
and type II error (2.5) to be 0.05, namely, the probability of the algorithm to make
an error is always less than 5%. To guarantee sufficient accuracy of the probabil-
ity ratio approximation (5.13), a minimal number of N = 256 samples is set for
each run. The number of strata is taken to be 1, 2, 4, 8. Accordingly, the mini-
mal number of blocks are 256, 128, 64, 32; which are sufficient for large sample
approximation (see Section 5.3.2) to hold.
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Algorithm 5 is also compared with the sequential probability ratio test with
independent samples proposed in [36, 37, 38], which is represented by SPRT in
Table 5.2. The details of the simulation setups are given in Table 5.1.
Toy: A Discrete-Time Markov Chain of three states uniquely labeled by {1, 2, 3}
with probability transition matrix0.583 0.333 0.0840.417 0.417 0.166
0.278 0.444 0.278
 .
Check
P>p(s 6= 2)U[0,10](s = 1),
namely, whether the probability that a path avoids state 2 and finally returns back
to state 1 within 10 steps is greater than p. The estimated probability for (s 6=
2)U[0,10](s = 1) to hold is 0.794956586 by the average of 1 000 000 000 i.i.d.
samples. Therefore, the experiment is set for the following three cases
(p, δ) =

(0.794956586− 0.010002, 0.01),
(0.794956586− 0.005002, 0.005),
(0.794956586− 0.001002, 0.001).
where δ is the indifference parameter serving as an input to Algorithm 5.
One Die: A fair die modeled by a Discrete-Time Markov Chain of 13 states
and 20 transitions proposed in [98]. Each state is labeled by only one of s =
1, . . . , s = 7. Check
P>pF[0,3](s > 6),
The estimated probability for P>pF[0,3](s > 7) to hold is 0.749987868 by the
average of 1 000 000 000 i.i.d. samples. Therefore, the experiment is set for the
following three cases
(p, δ) =

(0.749987868− 0.010002, 0.01),
(0.749987868− 0.005002, 0.005),
(0.749987868− 0.001002, 0.001).
Two Dice: The sum of two fair dice modeled by a Discrete-Time Markov Chain
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Table 5.1: Summary of example models and testing formulas
Model States Transitions Testing Formula
Toy 3 9 P>p(s 6= 2)U[0,10](s = 1)
One Die 13 20 P>pF[0,3](s > 7)
Two Dice 45 79 P>pF[0,4](s = 5)
Election 1933 2557 P>pF[0,1](600 < s < 630)
of 45 states and 79 transitions proposed in [98]. Similar to One Die, the states are
either transient with at most two transitions with equal probability or sinks. Each
state is labeled by only one of s = 1, . . . , s = 34. Check P>pF[0,4](s = 5). The
estimated probability for F[0,4](s = 5) to hold is 0.249983470 by the average of
1 000 000 000 i.i.d. samples. Therefore, the experiment is set for the following
three cases
(p, δ) =

(0.249983470− 0.010002, 0.01),
(0.249983470− 0.005002, 0.005),
(0.249983470− 0.001002, 0.001).
Election: Synchronous leader election protocol of 4 processors and 5 candi-
dates proposed in [99], which is modeled by a Discrete-Time Markov Chain of
1933 states and 2557 transitions. Check P>pF[0,1](600 < s < 630), where s is a
numbering of the states. The estimated probability for F[0,1](600 < s < 630) to
hold is 0.040002770 by the average of 1 000 000 000 i.i.d. samples. Therefore, the
experiment is set for the following three cases
(p, δ) =

(0.040002770− 0.010002, 0.01),
(0.040002770− 0.005002, 0.005),
(0.040002770− 0.001002, 0.001).
The description of the simulation setups is summarized by Table 5.1. The sim-
ulation results for the above examples are shown in Table 5.2. The error prob-
ability and average sample size are derived by repeatedly running the algorithm
for 10 000 to ensure statistical significance. The sample standard errors for the
error probabilities and the average sample sizes are omitted in these tables for
compactness.
The average sample size for Algorithm 5 for 1 stratum is approximately equal
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(a) δ = 0.01. (b) δ = 0.005. (c) δ = 0.001.
Figure 5.1: Summary of reduction in average sample sizes for the toy, one die,
two dice and election examples for three choices of indifference parameter δ.
to the SPRT algorithm using independent samples. The former is always slightly
larger than the latter, because there is a constraint on the minimal sample size.
In all the cases, the actual type I error and type II error are controlled approx-
imately below 0.05 with tolerable excess. These confirm that the large sample
approximation used in Algorithm 5 is reasonable.
The reduction of sample size by stratification, as shown in Table 5.2a-5.2d, is
visualized in Figure 5.1 below. The result shows that stratified sampling reduces
the number of total samples (number of strata × number of blocks of stratified
samples), compared to independent sampling. Specifically, Algorithm 5 for 8
strata reduces the number of total samples by 30%− 60% in the four examples.
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Table 5.2: Average number of samples needed and error probabilities for
SPRT with independent samples and Algorithm 5 for different strata sizes
on the examples.
Case 1 2 3
Strata Samples Error Samples Error Samples Error
SPRT 2054.4 4.68% 8276.8 4.38% 185310.9 2.74%
1 2275.5 5.13% 8708.4 4.66% 186778.3 2.80%
2 2283.6 5.33% 8684.3 4.41% 187172.8 2.76%
4 2083.6 5.63% 8038.4 4.33% 174372.5 2.99%
8 1485 4.93% 5692.3 4.55% 123723.0 2.79%
(a) Toy
Case 1 2 3
Strata Samples Error Samples Error Samples Error
SPRT 2403.7 4.65% 9470.1 4.40% 218546.6 2.90%
1 2638.6 4.64% 9956.6 5.14% 221318.4 3.25%
2 1759.7 3.94% 6772.1 4.01% 149272.3 3.08%
4 1898.1 4.48% 7474.6 4.32% 162201.5 2.91%
8 1803.7 4.56% 7027.1 4.27% 155766.0 2.88%
(b) One Die
Case 1 2 3
Strata Samples Error Samples Error Samples Error
SPRT 2573.5 4.82% 10019.2 4.54% 221101.3 2.67%
1 2605.9 3.67% 9878.5 3.86% 220478.8 3.17%
2 1753.0 4.14% 6702.0 4.54% 148054.3 2.81%
4 1180.1 4.02% 4499.1 4.38% 98349.0 3.03%
8 994.7 4.41% 3843.9 4.21% 84064.6 3.00%
(c) Two Dice
Case 1 2 3
Strata Samples Error Samples Error Samples Error
SPRT 661.4 4.21% 2310.8 4.05% 45765.1 2.81%
1 586.4 1.33% 1976.1 1.91% 44506.4 2.20%
2 572.4 1.20% 1896.6 2.08% 42118.4 2.20%
4 535.8 1.57% 1758.4 2.22% 39154.0 2.43%
8 453.4 1.97% 1462.5 2.73% 31370.4 2.44%
(d) Election
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Part II
Differential Privacy
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CHAPTER 6
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
This chapter focuses on a general framework of distributed control systems in
which agents share information based on randomized mechanisms, and sets a base
for the next two chapters. The formulation of the system is given in Section 6.1,
the definition for ε-differential privacy in the system is given in Section 6.2, metric
of tracking performance in Section 6.3, and the unbiased estimators of the private
data and its accuracy in Section 6.4.
6.1 Linear Distributed Systems with Randomized
Communication
Let us consider a linear distributed control system with N agents in which each
agent will use a randomized mechanism to share information on a finite time hori-
zon T > 0. A schematic diagram of the system is shown in Figure 6.1.
The dynamics of an individual agent is influenced by the actual states of other
agents. For example in a distributed traffic control scenario [100], any particular
agent’s speed and choice of the route are influenced by the state of other agents
as they share a common resource, the roadways. By explicitly exchanging infor-
mation about their states, the agents could achieve better performance (routing
delays), but at the same time, by sharing exact information about their states they
may give away too much information about their private data. Thus the agents
choose to share only noisy versions of their state using a randomized mechanism.
Formally, the state evolution xi ∈ X = Rn of agent i is modeled as a discrete time
dynamical system:
xi(t+ 1) = Axi(t) + vi(t) +
c
N
∑
j∈[N ]
xj(t), (6.1)
where (a) xi(t) is the state of agent i; (b) vi is the local control input; (c)c ∈
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R is a coupling constant capturing the aggregate influence of the other agents,
for example, congestion. The aggregated state of the system is denoted by x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xN) ∈ XN . Besides, each agent is given a priori a preference (or
target) pi(t), namely a sequence of waypoints.
As alluded to above, to keep the communications private, agent i adds noise ni
to its state and reports this noisy state x˜i to the server:
x˜i(t) = xi(t) + ni(t). (6.2)
Let the noisy state live in the same space as the actual state, x˜i ∈ X = Rn.
The goal of each agent i is to track the preference. To achieve this, the agents
use a feedback control vi(t) based on the information ui(t) = − cN
∑
j∈[N ] x˜j
received from the server, where x˜i is the reported state of agent i. Due to privacy
consideration, the reported states are not precisely the states of the agents, but
random variables that approximate the real states. Here, consider the following
linear feedback control law for the agents,
vi(t) = K
′(xi(t)− pi(t+ 1)) + (I − A)pi(t+ 1)− ui(t), (6.3)
where the K ′(xi(t) − pi(t + 1)) is a linear feedback term of the tracking error,
(I −A)pi(t+ 1) is an additive term to move the equilibrium of xi(t) to pi(t+ 1),
and −ui(t) tries to cancel the effect of the aggregate state. Thus,
x˜i(t) = xi(t) + ni(t), (6.4)
ui(t) =
c
N
∑
j∈[N ]
x˜j, (6.5)
xi(t+ 1) = Kxi(t) + (I −K)pi(t+ 1)
− ui(t) + c
N
∑
j∈[N ]
xj(t), (6.6)
where K = K ′ + A ∈ Rn×n is the closed-loop dynamics matrix and c ∈ R is a
coupling constant. If another linear feedback control is used, this analysis can be
applied with straightforward modifications.
For an individual agent, the combination of the initial state and the sequence of
preferences di = (xi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(T − 1)) is referred to as the private data of
the agent. Similarly, the private data set of the system is the ordered collection
D = {di|i ∈ [N ]} of N elements, such that the ith element in D is di. The set of
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all private data is denoted byD. In addition, refer to (a) the sequence of aggregated
states x(0), x(1), . . . , x(T − 1) generated by the system as the trajectory of the
system, and (b) the sequence of reported states x˜(0), x˜(1), . . . , x˜(T −1) generated
by the system as the observation sequence of the system. For a private data set D
of the system, denote OD = {x˜(t)}T−1t=0 as the observation sequence up to time T
that takes values in XNT .
Combining the above equations, the closed-loop dynamics of agent i is:
xi(t+ 1) = Kxi(t) + (I −K)pi(t+ 1)− c
N
∑
j∈[N ]
nj(t). (6.7)
Agent i’s state at time t can be written as a function of its preference sequence
{pi(s)}s∈[t] and the sequence {ni(s)|i ∈ [N ], s ∈ [t]} of noise vectors added in all
previous rounds. Iteratively applying (6.7) gives
xi(t) =K
txi(0) +
t∑
s=1
Kt−s(I −K)pi(s)
− c
N
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1
∑
j∈[N ]
nj(s).
(6.8)
By (6.8), it is obvious that the following statement holds.
Remark 2. Given the private data set D, the system trajectory {x(t)}t<T is
uniquely determined by the value of the sequence of reported statesOD = {x˜(t)}t<T ,
Denote ρ(D,O) = {x(t)}t<T as the trajectory corresponds to data set D and
observation O and ρ(D,O)(t) = x(t) as the state of the trajectory at time t.
Formally, the randomized mechanism M has two components: (i) a discrete-
time stochastic process, {n(t)}t<T and (ii) a deterministic function that maps the
private data set D and the outputs of the stochastic process to an observation
sequence {x˜(t)}t<T . In the rest of the part, it is assumed that the stochastic process
{n(t)}t<T is well behaved such that every n(t) has absolute continuous probability
distribution function.
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Figure 6.1: Diagram of a distributed control system.
6.2 Differential Privacy of Distributed Control
Systems
The standard definition of differential privacy in the context of databases [49,
50] does not consider the metric on the data. Here, in the context of dynamical
systems, the metric version of differential privacy used in [61] is adopted.
Definition 21. For two data sets D = {di}i∈[N ] and D′ = {d′i}i∈[N ], the distance
between the sets is d(D,D′) =
∑
i∈[N ] ‖di − d′i‖1.
Definition 22. Given a time horizon T > 0 and a parameter  > 0, a randomized
mechanismM : D → OD is -Differentially Private up to time T − 1, if for any
subset O ⊆ XNT and any two data sets D,D′, the inequality
P [OD ∈ O] ≤ ed(D,D′)P [OD′ ∈ O] (6.9)
holds, where the random variables OD and OD′ are the observation sequences
generated by the two data sets D and D′.
Remark 3. If the system is -Differentially Private up to time T − 1, then it is
-Differentially Private up to any time S < T . Taking O = O′ × X T−S , where
O′ ⊆ X S , gives the condition for -Differential Privacy up to time S.
Roughly speaking, the definition above requires that the probabilities of getting
the same observation sequence are close depending on the distance between the
two data sets. In other words, the probability that a small change in the private
data is detected from the observation sequence is very low.
The privacy of the system increases as  decreases. For →∞, all randomizing
mechanisms are -Differentially Private; for  = 0, only the mechanisms that
generate identical observation sequences will be -Differentially Private.
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6.3 Influence on the Dynamics of the System
Adding noise to the system affects the dynamics of the system. In this section,
the trade-off between Differential Privacy and the mean-square tracking error is
studied. For a -differentially private mechanismM and a private data set D as
discussed in Section 6.1, the mean-square tracking error is used to define a cost
function for agent i up to time T − 1 by
cost,D,i = E
[
T−1∑
t=1
‖xi(t)− pi(t)‖22
]
. (6.10)
Obviously, the cost functions increase with time T . Let {x(0), . . . , x(T − 1)} be
the aggregate trajectory of the system with data set D and no noise, i.e., ni(t) = 0
for all t. Define costD,i =
∑T−1
t=1 ‖xi(t)−pi(t)‖22 be the cost associated with agent
i. The cost of privacy of mechanismM is defined as the supremum in the change
of single agent’s cost over all data sets:
∆(, T ) = sup
i∈[N ]
D∈D
(cost,D,i − costD,i), (6.11)
which is called ∆(, T ) the cost of privacy (or CoP). It increases when larger noise
is added to the system.
6.4 Accuracy of unbiased estimators
Consider the unbiased estimator
Dˆ = {(xˆi(0), pˆi(1), . . . , pˆi(T − 1))|i ∈ [N ]} (6.12)
of the private data from a sequence of reported states OD. Since Dˆ is a function
of OD, thus for any θ,
f(θ|D) ≤ ed(D−D′)f(θ|D′) (6.13)
where f(θ|D) and f(θ|D′) are the probability distribution functions of Dˆ given
the private data D and D′, respectively.
There are multiple ways to measure the accuracy of the estimator Dˆ, including
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variance, high-order moment and entropy. In this work, the (Shannon) entropy
H(Dˆ) is used to measure the amount of information that can be derived from the
estimation. It decreases when the p.d.f. of the estimator becomes sharper, and vice
versa. It will be shown in Section 8 that if the system is -Differentially Private,
then there is a lower bound on H(Dˆ) and the minimum is achieved by adding
Laplace noise.
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CHAPTER 7
DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE AND
TRACKING
In this section, the impact of differential privacy is studied on the tracking per-
formance of a linear distributed control system. It can be shown that there is a
trade-off between the level of differential private of the agents’ private data and
the tracking performance of the system.
7.1 Sensitivity and Differential Privacy
For a fixed data set D, each observation sequence {x˜(t)}t<T corresponds to a
unique trajectory {x(t)}t<T independent of the precise design of mechanismM.
A differentially private mechanism can be proposed for linear distributed control
systems using the idea of sensitivity.
Definition 23. The sensitivity of randomized mechanism at time t is defined as the
supremum `1-norm between trajectories corresponding to the same observation
sequence and data sets:
S(t) = sup
adj(D,D′)
O∈XNT
‖ρ(D,O)(t)− ρ(D′, O)(t)‖1
d(D,D′)
. (7.1)
If the sensitivity is finite, the following lemma established in [75] suggest that
by adding a sequence of Laplace noise from a distribution with parameter S(t)/
at each round t, the mechanism is differentially private.
Lemma 4. For any time bound T and privacy parameter  > 0, for Mt
∆
=
TS(t)/, a randomized mechanism is -differentially private up to time T , if the
noise {n(t)}t<T is independent and follows {Lap(M0, nN),Lap(M1, nN), . . . ,
Lap(MT−1, nN)}.
Proof. Fix any pair of data sets D,D′, and any set of observation sequences O ⊆
XNT . Denote fD and fD′ as the probability density functions of random process
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{x(t)}Tt=0 with data sets D and D′ respectively. Define the sets of trajectories
A
∆
= {ρ(D,O) : O ∈ O} and A′ ∆= {ρ(D′, O) : O ∈ O} respectively. Thus,
P [OD ∈ O]
P [OD′ ∈ O] =
∫
α∈A fD(α)dµ∫
α′∈A′ fD′(α
′)dµ′
. (7.2)
First, define a correspondence B between the sets A and A′, such that for α ∈ A
and α′ ∈ A′, B(α) = α′ if they have the same observation sequence up to time
T . From Proposition 2, thus α = ρ(D,O) and α′ = ρ(D′, O) are both unique.
Therefore B is a bijection. The probability of the sets A and A′ are related via the
bijection B, ∫
α′∈A′ fD′(α
′)dµ′ =
∫
B(α)∈A′ fD′(B(α))dµ
=
∫
α∈A fD′(B(α))dµ.
(7.3)
For a data set D, the trajectory α = {x(t)}t<T is uniquely defined by the noise se-
quence {n(t)}t<T , which follows {Lap(M0, nN),Lap(M1, nN), . . . ,Lap(MT−1,
nN)}. For any observation O ∈ O and trajectory α = ρ(D,O), denote O(k)i (t)
as the kth entry of the observation vector x˜i(t), and α
(k)
i (t) as the kth entry of the
state vector xi(t). Then the probability density of trajectory α is
fD(α) =
∏
i∈[N ], k∈[n]
t<T
fL(O
(k)
i (t)− α(k)i (t),Mt), (7.4)
where fL(·, λ) is the probability density of scalar Laplace distribution Lap(λ).
Similarly, for data set D′, the probability density function is the same
fD′(α) =
∏
i∈[N ], k∈[n]
t<T
fL(O
(k)
i (t)− α(k)i (t),Mt). (7.5)
Then, the distance between the trajectories α = ρ(D,O) and B(α) is bounded
with the sensitivity S(t). By the Definition 23, thus
‖ρ(D,O)(t)− ρ(D′, O)(t)‖1 ≤ S(t)d(D,D′). (7.6)
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By definition of `1-norm:
N∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
|α(k)i (t)−B(α)(k)i (t)| = ‖ρ(D,O)(t)− ρ(D′, O)(t)‖1
≤ S(t)d(D,D′).
(7.7)
For scalar Laplace distribution Lap(λ) and any x, x′ ∈ R, thus fL(x,λ)
x′,λ ≤ e
|x−x′|
λ .
This property gives
∏
i∈[N ]k∈[n]
fL(O
(k)
i (t)− α(k)i (t),Mt)
fL(O
(k)
i (t)−B(α)(k)i (t),Mt)
≤
∏
i∈[N ],k∈[n]
e
|(O(k)
i
(t)−α(k)
i
(t),Mt)−(O(k)i (t)−B(α)
(k)
i
(t)|
Mt
= exp
 ∑
i∈[N ],k∈[n]
|α(k)i (t)−B(α)(k)i (t)
Mt

≤ exp
(
S(t)d(D,D′)
Mt
)
.
(7.8)
Combining (7.2)-(7.8) gives
P [OD ∈ O]
P [OD′ ∈ O] ≤
T−1∏
t=0
exp
(
S(t)
Mt
)
≤ exp
(
T−1∑
t=0
S(t)d(D,D′)
Mt
)
.
(7.9)
If the sequence of Mt satisfies
∑
t∈[T ]
S(t)
Mt
≤ , then P[OD∈O]P[OD′∈O] ≤ exp (d(D,D
′)).
Thus the mechanism is -differentially private.
If a bound on the sensitivity S(t) of the linear distributed system (6.4)-(6.6)
is established at each round t, a differentially private mechanism can be imple-
mented. To represent the dynamics of the aggregated system with N agents, de-
fine two nN × nN matrices
K = IN ⊗K,
C = 1N ⊗ cIn
n
,
(7.10)
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where IN is the N ×N identity matrix, 1N is the N ×N matrix with all elements
being 1, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Combining (6.4)-(6.6) for all the
N agents without unrolling the ui(t) terms gives
x(t+ 1) = Kx(t) + (I −K)p(t+ 1) +Cx(t)− u(t)
= (K+C)x(t) + (I −K)p(t+ 1)− u(t).
(7.11)
Iteratively applying the above equation gives
x(t) = (K+C)tx(0)−
t−1∑
s=0
(K+C)t−su(t)
+
t∑
s=1
(K+C)t−s(I −K)p(s).
(7.12)
To prove the following theorem, fix two private data setsD andD′ and compute
the difference between the two trajectories. Recall that D and D′ are identical
except the preference of one agent (i). Then, the difference between the two
trajectories has two components: (1) the change in agent i’s state, and (2) the sum
of changes in other agents’ state. The sensitivity is then computed as a bound of
the sum of the above two components.
Theorem 9. For the linear distributed control system, for all t ∈ N the sensitivity
S(t) ≤ κ(t), where κ is defined as
κ(t)
∆
= ‖Gt −Kt‖1 + ‖Kt‖1 + ‖H‖1
t−1∑
s=0
(‖Gs −Ks‖1 + ‖Ks‖1), (7.13)
with G ∆= cI +K and H ∆= I −K.
Proof. Take a pair of private data sets D and D′, and a sequence of observations
O = {x˜(t)}t<T . By (6.5), the input {u(t)}t<T is also fixed. Then, by (7.12)
‖ρ(D,O)(t)− ρ(D′, O)(t))‖1 = ‖(K+C)t(x(0)− x′(0))
+
t∑
s=1
(K+C)t−s(I −K)(p(s)− p′(s))‖1.
(7.14)
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Expanding the term (K+C)s on the right-hand side of (7.14) gives
(K+C)s =


K
. . .
K
+ cN

I . . . I
... . . .
...
I . . . I


s
. (7.15)
The matrix (K+C) has two types of blocks: (1) K + c
N
I as the diagonal blocks
and (2) c
N
I as the off-diagonal blocks. As K and I are commutative, applying
binomial expansion of the (7.15) and after some lengthy but elementary linear
algebra the product matrix (K+C)s becomes
(K+C)s =

Ps Qs . . . Qs
Qs
. . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . Qs
Qs . . . Qs Ps
where (7.16)
Qs =
1
N
(Gs −Ks), and Ps = Qs +Ks, (7.17)
where G ∆= cI +K. (7.16) implies that
(K+C)s(I −K) =

P ′s Q
′
s . . . Q
′
s
Q′s
. . . . . . ...
... . . . . . . Q′s
Q′s . . . Q
′
s P
′
s
 (7.18)
where Q′s = QsH , P
′
s = Q
′
s + K
sH and H = I − K. With (7.16) and (7.18),
the right-hand side of (7.14) is bounded. By definition of adjacency, adj(D,D′)
if and only if there exists some i ∈ [N ], such that for any s ≤ t and all j 6= i,
pj(s)− p′j(s) = 0. That is, for any s ≤ t,
p(s)− p′(s) =
[
0, . . . , 0, [pi(s)− p′i(s)]>, 0, . . . , 0
]>
, (7.19)
has n non-zero entries corresponding to the preferences of some agent i, and all
other entires are 0. Then, (K+C)s(p(s)− p′(s)) is a vector with the ith block as
Ps(pi(s)− p′i(s)) and other blocks as Qs(pi(s)− p′i(s)). Similarly (K+C)s(I −
K)(p(s) − p′(s)) is a vector with the ith block as P ′s(pi(s) − p′i(s)) and other
blocks as Q′s(pi(s)−p′i(s)). Therefore, the term inside the norm on the right-hand
70
side of (7.14) is a vector where the ith block is
Pt(xi(0)− x′i(0)) +
t∑
s=1
P ′t−s(pi(s)− p′i(s)), (7.20)
and all the other N − 1 components are
Qt(xi(0)− x′i(0)) +
t∑
s=1
Q′t−s(pi(s)− p′i(s)). (7.21)
Substituting (7.20) and (7.21) into (7.14) and combining with ‖xi(0)− x′i(0)‖1 +
‖(pi(s)− p′i(s)‖1 = d(D,D′) give
S(t) ≤ (N − 1)(‖Qt‖1 +
t−1∑
s=0
‖Q′s‖1) + ‖Pt‖1 +
t∑
s=1
‖P ′s‖1. (7.22)
Using (7.17), Ps, P ′s is represented by Qs, Q
′
s, K and H . Therefore,
S(t) ≤ (N − 1)(‖Qt‖1 +
t−1∑
s=0
‖Q′s‖1) + ‖Qt‖1 + ‖Kt‖1
+
t∑
s=1
‖Q′s‖+
t∑
s=1
‖Ks‖1‖H‖1
= N(‖Qt‖1 +
t−1∑
s=0
‖Q′s‖1) + ‖Kt‖1 + ‖H‖1
t∑
s=1
‖Ks‖1
(7.23)
Again from (7.17), substitute Qs and Q′s by H,G and K,
S(t) ≤ ‖Gt −Kt‖1 + ‖Kt‖1
+ ‖H‖1
t∑
s=1
(‖Gs −Ks‖1 + ‖Ks‖1)
= κ(t).
(7.24)
Remark 4. The upper bound on the sensitivity at time t, κ(t) has two components:
(a) ‖Kt‖1 + ‖H‖1
∑t
s=1 ‖Ks‖1 overapproximates the change in agent i’s state
(xi) if its own preference changes at each time up to t, and
(b) ‖Gt − Kt‖1 + ‖H‖1
∑t−1
s=0 ‖Gs − Ks‖1 overapproximates the sum of the
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changes in other agents’ state given agent i’s preference changes upto t.
Remark 5. κ(t) is independent of the number of agents (N ). It only depends on
matrix K, the coupling constant c and time t. K is specified by the individual’s
control function, which assumes to be stable. The more stable the matrix K is, the
faster ‖Kt‖1 decays to 0. The coupling constant c quantifies the influence of the
aggregate on each agent. The matrixG = cI+K captures the combined dynamics
under the influence of the environment and the dynamics of the individual agents.
The weaker the physical coupling, the smaller ‖Gt‖1. Therefore, as the dynamics
of the individual agents become more stable or the physical coupling between
agents becomes weaker, the sensitivity of the system decreases.
Remark 6. The dependence of κ(t) on time t changes based on the stability of
the K and G matrices. If G and K are stable, κ(t) converges to a constant as
t→∞. Otherwise, κ(t) grows exponentially with t.
Theorems 9 immediately suggest a noise-adding mechanism which guarantees
differential privacy of the distributed linear control system.
Example 4. Apply the strategy explained above to a system with K = 1
5
I2. G =
(c+ 1
5
)I2. By Theorem 9, the sensitivity bound is
S(t) ≤ κ(t) = 4 + 20c
20− 25c +
16− 45c
20− 25c
(
c+
1
5
)t
(7.25)
As stated in Remark 5, the sensitivity bound is independent of N . If G is stable,
that is |c+ 1
5
| ≤ 1, the sensitivity S(t) is bounded and converges to a constant as
t → ∞. Otherwise, if |c + 1
5
| > 1, κ(t) diverges. The parameter of the Laplace
distribution is chosen to be Mt =
κ(t)T

. By Lemma 4, the system guarantees
-differential privacy upto time T for arbitrary T .
7.2 Cost of Privacy in Linear Distributed Control
In this section, the cost of privacy for the randomizing mechanism is studied com-
pared to a perfectly observable (noise free) system using the same controller. First,
from (6.7), the tracking behavior of the system depends on the matrix K.
Remark 7. Taking expectation on both sides of (6.7) gives E [xi(t)− pi(t)] =
KE [xi(t− 1)− pi(t)]. If the closed-loop matrix K is Hurwitz, the state of each
agent converges to the preference in expectation.
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The cost of privacy varies depending on the proper of K.
Theorem 10. The cost of privacy of the -differentially private mechanismM of
Lemma 4 and Example 4 is of orderO( T
3
N2
) if the matrixK is Hurwitz. Otherwise,
it grows exponentially with T .
Proof. Given the -differentially private mechanismM, the perfectly observable
system is obtained by setting the noise values to be 0. Denote by x¯i(t) the state
of agent i for the perfectly observable system at time t. From (6.8), by fixing
ni(t) = 0,
x¯i(t) = K
tpi(0) +
t∑
s=1
Kt−s(I −K)pi(s).
Define a n × nN matrix B ∆= c
N
[I, . . . , I]. Again from (6.8), the state of an
individual agent i is
xi(t) = x¯i(t)−
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bn(s).
The cost of the mechanismM can be written as
cost,D,i = E
[
T−1∑
t=1
‖xi(t)− pi(t)‖22
]
= E
[
T−1∑
t=1
‖x¯i(t)−
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bn(s)− pi(t)‖22
]
=
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
‖x¯i(t)− pi(t)‖22 + ‖
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bn(s)‖22
−2(x¯i(t)− pi(t))>
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bn(s)
]
The first term on the right-hand side is the cost of the system with perfect obser-
vations, that is, costD,i. The last term on the right-hand side is the expectation
of a linear combination of zero-mean noise terms, and therefore, equals 0. By
Definition,
∆(, T ) = sup
D,i
[cost,D,i − costD,i]
=
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
‖
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bn(s)‖22
] (7.26)
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In the mechanism M, for different time steps s, τ , the noise n(s) and n(τ) are
independent. The right-hand side of (7.26) reduces to
T−1∑
t=1
E
[
t−1∑
s=0
n(s)>B>(Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1Bn(s)
]
.
Denote n(k)(s), k ∈ [nN ], be the kth element of the vector n(s). It follows
that (a) for k 6= j ∈ [nN ], E [n(k)(s)n(j)(s)] = 0, and (b) for any k ∈ [nN ],
E
[
n(k)(s)n(k)(s)
]
= 2M2s . Thus, the above expression is reduced to
T−1∑
t=1
t−1∑
s=0
2M2sTr(B
>(Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1B), (7.27)
where Tr(A) stands for the trace of matrix A. Recall that B = c
N
[I, . . . , I]. It
follows that
Tr(B>(Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1B)
=
c2
N
Tr((Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1) =
c2
N
‖Kt−s−1‖22.
Substituting the above equation into (7.27) yields
∆(, T ) =
2c2
N
T−1∑
t=1
t−1∑
s=0
M2s ‖Kt−s−1‖22
Interchanging the order of summation gives
∆(, T ) =
2c2
N
T−2∑
s=0
T−1∑
t=s+1
M2s ‖Kt−s−1‖22
=
2c2
N
T−2∑
s=0
M2s
T−s−2∑
t=0
‖Kt‖22.
(7.28)
Recall that in Lemma 4, Ms =
Tκ(s)

. Combining this with (7.28),
∆(, T ) =
2c2(T − 1)2
N2
T−2∑
s=0
κ(s)2
T−s−2∑
t=0
‖Kt‖22.
From the above expression it is clear ∆(, T ) is inversely proportional to N and
2. As the matrix K is Hurwitz,
∑T−s−2
t=0 ‖Kt‖2 converges to some constant as
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T → ∞. By Remark 6, if G is stable then κ(s) converges to some constant as
s → ∞, ∑T−2s=0 κ(s)2 grows linearly with T , thus ∆(, T ) ∼ O( T 3N2 ). Otherwise,
if G is unstable, ∆(, T ) grows exponentially with T .
Example 5. Continuing with the system described in Example 4, the cost of pri-
vacy associated with the communication strategy of (7.28) is established. In this
example, K = 0.2I . The coupling parameter c is chosen to be 0.4. Then, the
closed-loop system is stable. Therefore, the sensitivity is bounded by κ(t) =
1.2 − 0.2 × 0.6t. The cost of privacy of the system with N agents at time T
follows 0.24(T−1)
3
N2
+O( T
2
N2
).
Example 6. Consider a linear distributed control system in which each agent is a
point on the plane moving towards a randomly chosen destination with dynamics
described in Example 5 and control strategies given in Example 5.
The cost of each agent is defined by the distance between its position to its
destination. The coupling between agents is the repulsive force in the direction of
the center of gravity (CM) of the population. Thus, if the control of an individual
fights the force too strongly without the knowledge of the CM then a higher cost is
incurred. The system is numerically simulated with different levels of privacy and
different distributions of destinations and make the following observations.
Figure 7.1 shows the relative costs of control with (dark blue) no communica-
tion and (light green) private communication, with respect to cost of control with
complete (or broadcast) communication. First of all, if both the initial positions
and the destinations are chosen with 0 mean, then the CM of the population hov-
ers around the origin and in that case, the contribution of the coupling is small.
As a result, there is not much to be gained through communication and the cost of
the system with privacy is comparable to the cost of the system with no communi-
cation.
When the destination comes from some biased (nonzero mean) distributions, the
cost of control with private communication starts to become smaller compared to
those of systems with no communications.
Figure 7.2 shows that for the same distribution of initial positions and desti-
nations the cost of privacy changes as predicted by Theorem 10. First of all, a
higher level of privacy comes with a higher cost (Figure 7.2a). Secondly, a larger
number of agents (N ) gives a lower cost of privacy (Figure 7.2b). As N changes
from 10 to 100, the CoP decreases from 4 to 0.4. And finally a longer time horizon
(T ) translates to higher costs (Figure 7.2c). The simulation results matches the
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Figure 7.1: Increase in cost with biased sampled destinations. The blue and green
lines capture the relative cost of control with no communication and private com-
munication with respect to the cost of control with broadcast preferences respec-
tively.
theoretical result that the cost of privacy has the order of O( T
3
N2
).
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(a) CoP v.s. privacy
level .
(b) CoP v.s. number
of agents N .
(c) CoP v.s. time
horizon T .
Figure 7.2: Cost of Privacy for different privacy level, number of agents and time
horizon.
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CHAPTER 8
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND ENTROPY
In this section, the impact of differential privacy on estimating the private data
of the system from the noisy communication is studied, namely the sequence of
reported states OD = {x˜(t)}t<T . It can be shown that under certain technical
assumptions, there is an optimal mechanism of adding correlated noise that mini-
mizes the entropy of unbiased estimators on the private data.
First, it is assumed that the noise n(t) is mean-zero, namely E[n(t)] = 0. To
facilitate further discussion, the dynamics of distributed system (7.11) (7.12) is
written in the following aggregated form,
x(t+ 1) = (K+C)x(t)−Cx˜(t) + (I −K)p(t+ 1), (8.1)
x(t) =(K+C)tx(0)
+
t−1∑
s=0
(K+C)t−s−1((I −K)p(s+ 1)−Cx˜(t)),
(8.2)
where
x˜(t) = x(t) + n(t) (8.3)
is the noisy observation, and
n(t) = (n1(t), n2(t), . . . , nN(t)) ∈ XN
is the aggregated noise.
Recall from Section 6.4 that Dˆ is an unbiased estimator of the private data D
given observation OD up to time T − 1. There is a lower bound on the entropy of
the estimator.
Theorem 11. If the private dataD = (x(0), p(1), . . . , p(T−1)) is -Differentially
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Private and (I − K) is invertible, then the entropy of any unbiased estimator Dˆ
of the private data satisfies
H(Dˆ) ≥ Nn(1− ln(/2)) +N(T − 1)H((I −K)v), (8.4)
where v ∼ Lap(1/, n). The minimum is achieved by adding noise
n(0) = v(0), (8.5)
and for t ≥ 1,
n(t) = (K+C)tv(0) +
t∑
s=1
(K+C)t−s(I −K)v(s), (8.6)
where v(t) ∼ Lap(1/, nN) are independent for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
To prove Theorem 11, following condition for -Differential Privacy is needed
for the system.
Proposition 1. If the private data
D = (x(0), p(1), . . . , p(T − 1))
is -Differentially Private, then the probability density function f(θ|D) of the es-
timator Dˆ satisfies
|mˆ · ∇f(θ|D)| ≤ f(θ|D) (8.7)
almost everywhere, where mˆ is an arbitrary unit vector.
Proof. By (6.13), for any θ, θ′ ∈ XN and y ∈ XN ,
f(θ|D) ≤ e‖θ−θ′‖1f(θ′|D).
Thus,
f(θ|D)− f(θ′|D)
‖θ − θ′‖1 ≤
e‖θ−θ
′‖1 − 1
‖θ − θ′‖1 f(θ
′|D). (8.8)
Letting θ → θ′gives | θ−θ′‖θ−θ′‖1 · ∇f(θ
′|D)| ≤ f(θ′|D), for θ′ almost everywhere,
abbreviated as a.e. Since θ can approach θ′ in arbitrary direction, it is proved that
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|mˆ · ∇f(θ′|D)| ≤ f(θ′|D) for arbitrary unit vector nˆ and θ′ a.e.
8.1 One-shot case
Consider the case of T = 1 where D = (x(0)) and
x˜(0) = x(0) + n(0) (8.9)
The initial state x(0) is kept -Differentially Private by adding a mean-zero noise
n which may depend on the value of x(0). Let f(y|x) be the probability density
function of the estimator xˆ(0) when x(0) = x. Denote p(x, y) = f(y|x). It is
assumed that p(x, y) is absolutely continuous in both x and y. In this case, the
following equivalent condition for -Differential Privacy can be derived.
To minimizes the entropy of the estimation xˆ(0), the noise n(0) should have the
following symmetric properties.
Lemma 5. The entropy of estimator xˆ(0) is minimized when the probability dis-
tribution function f(y|x) = p(x, y) of the observation x˜(0) satisfies that for any
x ∈ XN , q(x, y) = p(x, y − x) is an even function in each component ym of y.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume m = 1. Let
H+1 (p) = sup
x∈XN
∫
[x1,∞)×Rn−1
−p(x, y) ln p(x, y)dy, (8.10)
H−1 (p) = sup
x∈XN
∫
(−∞,x1]×Rn−1
−p(x, y) ln p(x, y)dy. (8.11)
Define
p′(x, y) =

p(x, y)
if y1 > x1, H+1 (p) ≤ H−1 (p)
or y1 < x1, H+1 (p) > H
−
1 (p) ,
p(x, z)
if y1 > x1, H+1 (p) > H
−
1 (p)
or y1 < x1, H+1 (p) ≤ H−1 (p) .
(8.12)
where zi = 2xi − yi, i = 1,zi = yi, i = 2, 3, . . . , n. (8.13)
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It is easy to check that p′(x, y) satisfies the constraints in Problem 1 and f ′(y|x) =
p′(x, y − x) is an even function in each component ym of y. Finally, the proof is
finished by noting that H (p′) = 2 min{H+1 (p) , H−1 (p)} ≤ H+1 (p) + H−1 (p) =
H (p), where the equality holds iff H+1 (p) = H
−
1 (p).
Lemma 6. The entropy of estimator xˆ(0) is minimized when the probability distri-
bution function f(y|x) = p(x, y) of the observation x˜(0) satisfies that for any a ∈
R andm ∈ [n], fixing x1, . . . , xm−1, xm+1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , ym−1, ym+1, . . . , yn,
p(x, y) =p(x1, . . . , xm−1, 2a− xm, xm+1, . . . , xn,
y1, . . . , ym−1, 2a− ym, ym+1, . . . , yn)
(8.14)
Proof. Fix x1, . . . , xm−1, xm+1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , ym−1, ym+1, . . . , yn and write
p(x, y) as p(xm, ym) for simplicity. Without loss of generality, assume m = 1.
Let L+ =
{
x ∈ XN |x1 ≥ t
}
and L− =
{
x ∈ XN |x1 < t
}
. Define
H+ (p) = sup
L+
∫
XN
−p(x, y) ln p(x, y)dy, (8.15)
H− (p) = sup
L−
∫
XN
−p(x, y) ln p(x, y)dy. (8.16)
If H+ (p) ≤ H− (p), let
p′(x1, y1) =
p(x1, y1), x1 ∈ L+,p(2a− x1, 2a− y1), x1 ∈ L−, (8.17)
otherwise, let
p′(x1, y1) =
p(2a− x1, 2a− y1), x1 ∈ L+,p(x1, y1), x1 ∈ L−. (8.18)
It is easy to check that p′(x, y) satisfies the constraints in Problem 1 and p′(x1, y1) =
p′(2a − x1, 2a − y1). Finally, the proof is finished by noting that H (p′) =
min{H+ (p) , H− (p)} ≤ max{H+ (p) , H− (p)} = H (p), where the equality
holds iff H+ (p) = H− (p).
The above two propositions imply that the optimal noise added is independent
of the original data.
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Lemma 7. The entropy of estimator xˆ(0) is minimized when the noise n(0) is
independent of the value of the initial state x(0).
Proof. Consider q(x, y) = p(x, y− x), which is the probability distribution func-
tion of the noise n(0) for fixed x. Lemma 6 shows that for any t ∈ R and m ∈ [n],
q(xm, ym) = q(2t− xm,−ym).
Lemma 5 implies that
q(2t− xm,−ym) = q(2t− xm, ym).
Therefore, the value of q(x, y) is independent of each xm.
Lemma 7 implies that
p(x, y) = f(y − x), (8.19)
where f is a even function in each xi. When nN = 1, minimizing the entropy of
xˆ(0) is equivalent to solving the following problem
Problem 1 (Scalar Case).
Minimize: H(f) = −
∫
[0,∞)
f(x) ln f(x)dx,
subject to: f(x) is absolutely continuous,
f(x) ≥ 0,
|f ′(x)| ≤ f(x) a.e.,∫
[0,∞)
f(x)dx =
1
2
.
Problem 1 can be solved with the following results.
Lemma 8. f(x) is non-increasing if it solves Problem 1.
Proof. Let f(x) be a function that solves Problem 1 and
g(x) = sup
y≥x
f(y).
Clearly, g(x) ≥ f(x) for x ≥ 0. Suppose that f(x) is not non-increasing, namely,
for some x∗ > 0, g(x∗) > f(x∗). By the continuity of f , there exists a “largest”
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non-empty interval (a, b) containing x∗, on which g(x) > f(x). Note that b is
finite since f(x) > 0 and limx→∞ f(x) = 0. In addition, g(b) = f(b). Let
d =
1
f(a)
∫ b
a
f(x)dx, (8.20)
where d ∈ [0, b− a).
There are two cases on the value of a. If a > 0, then f(a) = g(a) = f(b) =
g(b). Define
h(x) =

f(x), x ∈ [0, a],
f(b), x ∈ [a, a+ d],
f(x+ b− a− d), x ∈ [a+ d,∞],
(8.21)
Otherwise, a = 0. Define
h(x) =
f(b), x ∈ [0, d],f(x+ b− d), x ∈ [d,∞], (8.22)
In both cases, h(x) satisfies the constraints in Problem 1 and H(h) < H(f). This
is in contradiction with the assumption.
Solution of Problem 1. Let F (x) =
∫∞
x
f(y)dy and note that f(∞) = 0. By the
definition of -Differential Privacy,
F (x) ≥
∫ ∞
x
|f ′(x)|dy ≥ |
∫ ∞
x
f ′(x)dy|
= |f(∞)− f(x)| = f(x),
(8.23)
where the equalities hold iff f ′(x) = −f(x) for x a.e. In particular, f(0) ≤
F (0) = /2.
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Lemma 8 implies that f ′(y) ≤ 0 a.e., thus
H(f) = −
∫ ∞
0
f(x) ln f(x)dx
= −
∫ ∞
0
f(x)
(
ln f(0) +
∫ x
0
f ′(y)
f(y)
dy
)
dx
= − ln f(0)
2
−
∫ ∞
0
f ′(y)
f(y)
(∫ ∞
x
f(x)dx
)
dy
= − ln f(0)
2
−
∫ ∞
0
f ′(y)F (y)
f(y)
dy
≥ − ln f(0)
2
−
∫ ∞
0
f ′(y)

dy
=
f(0)

− ln f(0)
2
,
(8.24)
where the equality holds iff f ′(x) = −f(x).
Since f(0) ∈ (0, /2], on which f(0)− 1
2
ln f(0) is decreasing, H(f) ≥ (1−
ln(/2))/2. Again, the equality holds if f ′(x) = −f(x) a.e.
In sum, H(f) achieves the minimum (1− ln(/2))/2 at f ′(x) = −f(x). Ap-
plying the conditions that f(x) ≥ 0 and ∫
[0,∞) f(x)dx = 1/2 gives the solution
to Problem 1,
f(x) =
e−x
2
. (8.25)
When nN ≥ 2, the goal is to solve the following problem
Problem 2 (Multi-dimensional Case).
Minimize: H(f) = −
∫
XN+
f(x) ln f(x)dx,
subject to: f(x) is absolutely continuous,
f(x) ≥ 0,
|∂f(x)
∂xi
| ≤ f(x),∀i ∈ [nN ] a.e.,∫
XN+
f(x)dx =
1
2nN
.
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Solution of Problem 2. For each fixed x2, x3, . . . , xn, let
gx2,x3,...,xn(x1) = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), (8.26)
then gx2,x3,...,xn(x1) ≥ 0, |g′x2,x3,...,xn(x1)| ≤ gx2,x3,...,xn(x1) and
H(f) = −
∫
Rn−1+
∫
[0,∞)
gx2,x3,...,xn(x1)
ln gx2,x3,...,xn(x1)dx1dx2dx3 . . . dxn.
(8.27)
To minimize H , it is required that
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = gx2,x3,...,xn(x1)
= e−x1h(x2, x3, . . . , xn)
(8.28)
where h(x2, x3, . . . , xn) is some function of x2, x3, . . . , xn. Repeating the above
argument shows that the minimum is achieved by
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = ke
−(x1+x2+...+xn) (8.29)
where k is some constant. Finally,
∫
XN+ f(x)dx =
1
2nN
, implies that k = ( 
2
)nN .
In this case, the lower bound is H(f) = nN
2
(1− ln(/2)).
From the above results, Theorem 11 is generalized to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given invertible M ∈ Rn×n and a randomizing mechanism x˜ =
Mx + w that protects the -Differential Privacy of the private data x ∈ Rn by
adding mean-zero noise w ∈ Rn, the entropy of any unbiased estimator xˆ from
observation x˜ satisfies
H (xˆ) ≥ H(Mv), (8.30)
and the minimum is achieved by adding noise n = Mv where v ∼ Lap(1/, n).
In particular, when M = I , thus
H (xˆ) ≥ n(1− ln(/2)). (8.31)
Proof. First, the proposition holds for M = I . In general, since M is invertible,
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from
M−1x˜ = x+M−1w
the minimal entropy of the estimator is achieved byM−1w ∼ Lap(1/, n), namely
w = Mv where v ∼ Lap(1/, n), and the minimal entropy is H(Mv).
8.2 General case
Theorem 11 is proved for the general case of T > 1 below.
Proof of Theorem 11. For simplicity, define
m(t) =
n(0), if t = 0n(t)− (K+C)n(t− 1), else . (8.32)
(8.1) (8.2) (8.3) implies that
x˜(0) = x(0) +m(0), (8.33)
and for t ≥ 1,
x˜(t)−Kx˜(t− 1) = (I −K)p(t) +m(t). (8.34)
Therefore, the privacy and estimation of x(0), p(1), . . . , p(T ) are independent.
Noting that
I −K = IN ⊗ (I −K)
is invertible, by Proposition 2, the entropy-minimizing mechanism that protects
the -Differential Privacy of D = (x(0), p(1), . . . , p(T )) is given by
m(t) =
v(0), if t = 0(I −K)v(t), else , (8.35)
namely,
n(0) = v(0), (8.36)
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and for t ≥ 1,
n(t) = (K+C)tv(0) +
t∑
s=1
(K+C)t−s(I −K)v(s), (8.37)
where v(t) ∼ Lap(1/, nN) are independent for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. The minimal
entropy of any unbiased estimator Dˆ of the private data is
H(Dˆ) =
T−1∑
t=0
H(m(t))
= Nn(1− ln(/2)) +N(T − 1)H((I −K)v),
(8.38)
where v(t) ∼ Lap(1/, n).
87
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
The first part of this thesis focuses on the statistical verification of stochastic hy-
brid system. Model reduction techniques have been performed on both Discrete-
Time and Continuous-Time Stochastic Hybrid Systems to reduce them to Discrete-
Time Markov Chains and Continuous-Time Markov Chains, respectively; and
statistical verification algorithms have been proposed to verify Linear Inequal-
ity LTL and Metric Interval Temporal Logic on these discrete probabilistic mod-
els. The advantage of stratified sampling in verifying Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic on Labeled Discrete-Time Markov Chains are also demonstrated; this
method can potentially be extended to other statistical verification algorithms to
reduce computational costs.
The second part focuses on the Differential Privacy in distributed systems. The
formulation and the Differential Privacy of the systems are formally defined. It is
shown that there is a trade-off between the Differential Privacy and the tracking
performance of the systems. In addition, the trade-off between the Differential
Privacy and the unbiased estimation of the private data is demonstrated, and an
optimal algorithm to achieve the best trade-off is given.
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